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/leftypol/ - Leftist Politically Incorrect

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File: 1624564955572.jpg ( 291.35 KB , 1488x934 , dielectrical.jpg )

 No.336051[Last 50 Posts]

Quite a few comments on this video claim that Cockshott is misrepresenting Hegel's work.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kjja-oNyfdI

Is Cockshott correct, is Hegel just doing intellectual sleight of hand?

The video itself seems to be part of a series responding to comments from his blog where he seems to claim that Dialectical Materialism was invented by social democrats to corrupt Marx's work.

https://paulcockshott.wordpress.com/2020/04/28/please-waste-no-time-on-hegel/
>>

 No.336056

very cursed image OP
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 No.336076

File: 1624565574274.png ( 85.12 KB , 1206x637 , Screenshot from 2021-06-24….png )

>>336051
Look how small the world is
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 No.336085

>>336076
Nice to see two academics of caliber be civil about their differences
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 No.336088

>>336064
What is this about humans being turing computers? This sounds like heavy autism that there is no evidence for. It also misunderstands Spinozas God, and the argument kind of hinges on this "God" not being real. Spinoza(and Hegel) are pretty much saying the universe is a hypercomputer.
>>

 No.336090

I think it's clear that Cockshott doesn't understand Hegel but that's part of why his work is valuable IMO. I don't read Cockshott for his philosophy. I like that he avoids metaphysics and focuses on analyzing empirical data. I like that subjects Marxist theories to the scientific method.
I would like to see a Hegelian thoroughly dissect TNS just out of interest but I don't think anything useful would come of it.
>>

 No.336099

The real question is: Why should we care?
Cockshott has nice policies and planning
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 No.336106

>>336051
Watching this video right now and Cockshott is talking about nerdy computer stuff all the time… I think he should make a video with Linus tech tips
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 No.336114

Honestly I don't really see any contradiction.
>>

 No.336117

Anyone remember AW? Should he debate Cockshott?
>>

 No.336156

>>336090
>>336099

I completely agree, I'm just trying to figure out what this dialectics argument is all about. It seems important
>>

 No.336158

>>336117
Nope, who is AW?
>>

 No.336170

>>336158
He was a pretentious asshole from the original leftypol who claimed he used Hegel to “debunk” Marx.
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 No.336188

File: 1624568639228.png ( 40.42 KB , 1039x188 , ClipboardImage.png )

>>336051

Cockshott doesn't believe consciousnesses is real. He thinks its a bourgeoisie spook. This is somewhat reasonable on its own, but he goes further and claims that science is objective without any proof. He is like Dennet, who believes that consciousness is a convenient hallucination.

>>335915
Quantum mechanics basically proves that that science is subjective. Zizek's Parallax View is the most common example of it applied to philosophy. Hard scientists often have trouble understanding the implications of the observer effect and think it implies rocks have thoughts and feelings like humans.
>>

 No.336190

>>336051
HNGGGGGG FUCKKKK FEMME HEGEL IS GETTING ME HARD! THE GUN JUST MAKES IT MORE AROUSING! IF I CAN'T HAVE GENTLE FEMDOM WITH MOMMY HEGEL THEN WHY GO ON LIVING?
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 No.336272

>>336188
>but he goes further and claims that science is objective without any proof
this reads like you have things ass-backward. science is the only way to acquire knowledge. there can be biases of course, because humans are partial to subjectivism

>Quantum mechanics basically proves that that science is subjective

no, it shows that physics is full of bourgeois subjectivism, something that is antithetical to physics. subjectivist notions belong in the theology departments

>Hard scientists often have trouble understanding the implications of the observer effect and think it implies rocks have thoughts and feelings like humans

animism is hecking valid and you are bigot for implying otherwise
>>

 No.336273

>>336188
https://spiritofcontradiction.eu/paul-cockshott/2013/06/12/historical-materialism-and-repudiation-of-subjectivism
He seems obsessed with this legal subject category, won't even entertain other types of subjects and keeps reiterating they are all derived from law. I agree with the whole anti-humanism to overcome what liberals think is human deal but you that would still leave you with a non-human subject. His seems like an inverse thatcher with niel degrass tyson - "individuals do not exist, only mathematically defined sets of atoms".
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 No.336276

>>336064
>Pic1
Glad to see my effortpost was capped & being spread. Ck is literally wrong.
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 No.336278

>>336188
Mind you, Penisboom included Dennet in his recommended ML reading list.
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 No.336280

>>336278
In his materialist subsection. Dennet is a materialist. Good job sherlock
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 No.336286

>>336276
I would call this an effortpost. You literally only quotet engels instead of writing your own post. But glad to see that you clap your own shoulder
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 No.336289

>>336286
I wouldn't*
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 No.336341

>>336064
Can someone explain this "hypercomputationalists"? I thought turing machines were hypothetical abstract machines. Is Cockshott an accelerationist?
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 No.336899

>>336117
AW was one of the worst people to ever graze that board. I wanted to beat the shit out of him so many times since all he was doing was spreading pessimistic nonsense. He was also hellbent on getting people to vote Democrat.
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 No.336938

>>336899
he was a hegelian socdem who denied the ltv in favor of his own reading of hegel
>>

 No.336943

>>336938
Yup. Asinine.

And his critique of the LTV was literally "muh mudpie". Hilariously bad.
>>

 No.337101

New multitude editor here, could someone here do a summary/rundown of this for us? We can also pay you a fee for your labour too.
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 No.337103

>>337101
Second this
>>

 No.337122

>>336188
>Quantum mechanics basically proves that that science is subjective
How?
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 No.337123

>>337122
it doesn't, its just another quantum woo fucker trying to justify anti materialist spookery
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 No.337137

Using dialectics was very usefull for Marx. And that is it. Why is everyone so obsessed with fucking Hegel and his boring philosophy which boils down to: constitutional monarchy of the Prussian type is the bestest state of things.
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 No.337140

>>337123
I want to see his argument for it though.
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 No.337149

>>336188
>Quantum mechanics basically proves that that science is subjective
You dont understand what the wave function collapse is. There is nothing subjective about it.
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 No.337151

>>337137
retard
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 No.337206

>>337149
>There is nothing subjective about it
copenhagenfags seem to think so, which is why you get spooky things like there having to be an "observer" and nonsense like the Heisenberg cut. QBism is even worse with this, taking the solipsistic nature of subjectivist QM and running with it
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 No.337210

>>337206
Is Heisenbergs uncertainness principle legit or is it cope?
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 No.337345

>>337210
no, the uncertainty principle is perfectly valid. similar effects arise in simulations. non-determinism isn't at odds with materialism
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 No.337403

Seems like Cockshott needs to read some Althusser.
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 No.337490

>>337403
Pff. He already has and has additionally written a critique already. Keep up.
>>

 No.337560

To condemn dialectical material is to condemn Marx.
I like Cockshott, but anyone who actually agrees with him on this is blatantly revisionist.
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 No.337567

>>337490
It's understandable for someone who is a computer scientist to not be able to overcome their empiricist mindset and shit on dialectical materialism.
>>

 No.337573

>>337567
t. normie
>>

 No.337575

>>337567
It is actually really unusual for a computer scientist to have an "empiricist mindset," especially one as vulgar as Cockshott's. Computer science is almost entirely a formal field.
>>

 No.337584

>>336085
well, they're academics

>>336188
>Quantum mechanics basically proves that that science is subjective
lmao, why do retards love to make dumbfuck statements about quantum mechanic only proving how much they dont understand shit
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 No.337609

>>337584
>lmao, why do retards love to make dumbfuck statements about quantum mechanic only proving how much they dont understand shit
They like to abuse science for an argument from authority fallacy and on top of that the Copenhagen interpretation invites just so much quantum woo with it's solipsistic bend. They should have gone with pilot wave.
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 No.337785

>>337609
>>337584
>>337206
>>337149
>QBism
>Pilot Wave
>incompleteness theorem
>exclusion principle
<Hard scientists often have trouble understanding the implications of the observer effect and think it implies rocks have thoughts and feelings like humans

Whats up retards.
>>

 No.337790

>>337785
based panpsychist hard scientists
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 No.337797

>>336088
>What is this about humans being turing computers? This sounds like heavy autism that there is no evidence for
Basic principle of compsci, humans and Turing machines solve the exact same set of problems, neither is more powerful than the other. It's not Reddit-tier "wot if the brain was Linux" autism, Turing machines are just an attempt to model thinking.
It's unprovable but on the other hand have you looked at proposed models of hypercomputation? Church-Turing is probably true.
>>

 No.337918

>>337797
>neither is more powerful than the other
I don't get this part. I understand mechanically how a brain could be modelled as a circuit but I don't think its true that we solve problems in the same way. Cockshott even talks about how a part of consciousnesses is noise. For example on the comments of his "waste no time on hegel" blog, someone brings up a horse

>Premise: All horses are animals.

>Ergo: The head of horse is the head of an animal.

cockshott responds

>You need three additional premises:

>1. There exists a set of heads
>2. Heads can be heads of other objects
>3. Horses have heads

Humans are not computers, and can skip computation through recognition, analogy and syllogism. Humans don't have to declare or assign variables to memory slots, they use the universe as a cache of data, and are perfectly capable of synthesizing more information in outputs than received in inputs. Consciousnesses is a higher level emergent type of computation if at all, like encryption or jpg(vs bmp) where the recognition of repeating patterns(or rather the smoothness or jaggedness of a given pattern) and allows reduced data to stand in for a larger whole. Cognition acts like a hash check that also tells you what is inside the file. A computer can't do "2"+"2"= "Four" directly, where a human can without the extra steps. You can't reduce that to a mechanical process. There is at the very least no proof in neuroscience that brain states are actually equivalent to computers, which makes the idea speculative at best.
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 No.337932

File: 1624647354841.png ( 230.78 KB , 1075x902 , ClipboardImage.png )

https://gjclokhorst.nl/hypercomputation.helsinki.pdf
I found a short slideshow about hypercomputers
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 No.338095

File: 1624650463342.png ( 139.74 KB , 363x290 , commissarcat.png )

>>337932
>Even if a hypercomputer were put into our hands, we could not determine whether it is a hypercomputer.

unfalsifiable claims are hyper unscientific
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 No.338164

>>338095
That specious assertion can be attributed originally to Popper who was trying to argue that the Marxian notion of the inevitable collapse of capitalism was unscientific on the grounds that such claims cannot be falsified. It's just an opinion, lol, also nice reddit spacing
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 No.338171

>>338164
>the Marxian notion of the inevitable collapse of capitalism was unscientific on the grounds that such claims cannot be falsified
Makes sense to me.
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 No.338173

>>338095
How is that claim unfalsifiable? If you determine that a hypercomputer is a hypercomputer, that falsifies it.
>>

 No.338177

>>338171
Okay that is your opinion and Popper's but neither of you are King of Science so you'll have to go write about it on your blog or something.
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 No.338182

>>338164
>Popper
>>

 No.338186

>>338177
No, it's not an opinion. Capitalism thrives on it's own self-destruction, every time it's been on the "brink of collapse" it just returned with greater intensity than before.
>>

 No.338191

>>338186
You have confused the referent of the sentence. "Your opinion" is that unfalsifiable claims are unscientific. That is merely an opinion.
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 No.338194

>>338191
Okay then, do you know how to scientifically prove an unfalsifiable hypothesis?
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 No.338195

>>338173
I have no good things to say about Popper or the inane claims about science but in this case we would say that the claim is not falsifiable because the protocol for making the determination in question cannot be carried out even in principle.
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 No.338198

>>338194
Whether or not I know how to do that is beside the matter entirely. Also you are probably conflating the word "scientifically" with the word "empirically" in your sentence anyway.
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 No.338204

>>338195
>the protocol for making the determination in question cannot be carried out even in principle
Sure, but that's exactly what the claim is. In this case it's "unfalsifiable" only because it's right.
>>

 No.338207

>>338204
Sure I have no objection to the text provided in the screenshot I was just explaining what the guy with the cat picture meant. But really he is just reacting to things with a quiver of cliches, so you don't have to pay him any mind.
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 No.338210

>>338198
Okay, can you give me a single example of a scientific theory or law that is unfalsifiable, other than anything to do with Marx.
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 No.338237

>>338210
I don't understand why I am on trial here. The fact that your judgment of what claims are scientific is an opinion should be manifest. What else could it be? I am merely saying that you share this opinion with Popper, who developed it in part because he wanted to denigrate Marxian studies as unscientific. If you want to investigate the matter further you are of course welcome to study the critiques of Popper. But I don't want to do this Steven Crowder "Change my mind!" back-and-forth.
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 No.338294

>>338237
>The fact that your judgment of what claims are scientific is an opinion should be manifest.
Nope, all I've done is ask you to prove your claim by providing me an example of something that is both scientific and unfalsifiable. But you can't, because your claim is just an opinion based on feelings.
Popper didn't argue that Marx was unscientific. Popper was actually "denigrating" retards like you who treat Marx like a prophet and his theories like revelation. If you want Marxism to be scientific then it MUST be open to revision.
>>

 No.338298

>>338210
Thats not how it works, science itself is unfalsifiable. Thats why it cannot make direct claims about reality itself, only phenomena. The scientific method and empiricism are methods of epistemology that make contingent claims about relationships between perceived objects. It has no relationship with Ontology. Science cannot prove that perceived objects map one-to-one with reality. Marxist dialectical materialism makes this more explicit, stating that matter is the primary way to obtain knowledge about reality, while being agnostic about the underlying substrate.

Saying that consciousness is an emergent hallucination caused by physical atoms going through a mechanical process is exactly the same as saying that humans are brains in vats or that we are all spirit orbs and physical reality itself is a hallucination. What people fail to understand when they take sense data as a given is that hallucinations still map on to reality in predictable and contingent ways. Putting on rose-tinted glasses doesn't make the world red, and you can still derive the original colors from the color shift, the relationship between different colored objects is maintained. Physicalists don't consider this and focus on rejecting that the world is red and start going into descriptions of em wavelengths instead of understanding the point that color can only exist as an experienced relationship. People keep insisting that the mind-body problem is solved or that it will be because its just a god of that gaps argument, but incompleteness shows that its not possible for formal logic to bridge the gap. Its extremely common among research scientists and engineers who are often working with applications of science and don't understand the fundamentals of their own field. These questions are very very far from being decided and its extremely arrogant and misguided to think they are.

https://www.youtube.com/c/CloserToTruthTV/videos?view=0&sort=p&flow=grid
This is a good channel for people to learn about the ontological implications of science and the many different interpretations and arguments around it from serious world renown scientists, philosophers and religious scholars. The host is an American Nueroscientist PhD who was an advisor to Xi Jinping. Each episode presents a topic and goes through interviews with relevant people who offer interpretations, the host tries to refute them and interview people who disagree, and then at the end he says that we just don't know yet for sure but the dialog brings us "closer to truth".

Can Brain Alone Explain Consciousness? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LyPEgKuqrtM
Are Brain and Mind the Same Thing? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2i9UPTDUFJo
Is Consciousness an Illusion? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2aPmC_zQ8bI
Are There Things Not Material? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWkYdMCuUHs
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 No.338304

File: 1624656156796.png ( 424.77 KB , 451x619 , 013.png )

I always had suspicion that dialectics were a scam - after all, what kinda logic is that, that allows contradictions?
I'm glad that big brain computer man validated my suspicions.
>>

 No.338308

>>338294
>Nope, all I've done is ask you to prove your claim by providing me an example of something that is both scientific and unfalsifiable.
You fail to even identify my claim.
>>

 No.338320

>>338304
>after all, what kinda logic is that, that allows contradictions
Hegel's dialectics has issues, but I don't think you understand what a contradiction is.
>>

 No.338324

>>338320
>but I don't think you understand what a contradiction is.
system of equations where
A = B
A =! B
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 No.338377

File: 1624658103412.png ( 280.66 KB , 1487x431 , ClipboardImage.png )


https://youtu.be/Kjja-oNyfdI?t=800
>perhaps if you're more adventurous go and read david deutsch whose paper on the universal quantum computer introduced the topic of quantum computing and is really and resolutely materialist

David Deutsch - Why is the Quantum so Strange? [3:39] https://youtu.be/mNP5w4n9sFU?t=219
<ok now how does the quantum part help us
>when the theory of computation was first discovered by by Babbage and then developed by Alan Turing during the 1930s it wasn't realized that this was a branch of physics at all it was invented as a branch of mathematics to study mathematical proofs and the the theory was built up from an injection that a certain type of abstract object the Turing machine could represent all things that could be computations now what quantum computers and then historically what happened after that is that people began to worry that the physical world might not be able to instantiate these these operations perfectly and that therefore the the the the real world might be a weaker kind of computer than the Turing computer that it might be an idealization now when we studied this more carefully and and this is where quantum computers began to begin to come in we found that not only can a universal computer exist physically but it's more powerful than a Turing machine and what the mathematicians were doing unconsciously is that they when they invented these abstract objects they were applying their intuition about physical objects they didn't know that that's what they were doing and because they were applying their intuition about physical objects they got it wrong they they thought about computing right making marks of squares of paper and then as Fineman remarked they thought they understood paper but in fact paper like everything else about quantum mechanics and the real computation in the world is is quantum computation the theory of quantum computation and that is a theory of physics so that means that the theory of computation is irretrievably within physics because of the quantum theory of computation
<now what is briefly the quantum theory of computation how does that work how is computation and quantum theory quantum mechanics integrated into a quantum theory of computation?
>a theory of computation within any laws laws of physics is the theory of how you can use physical objects to represent abstract objects so you want to represent the the integers 1 2 3 and you can use physical objects like fingers to say that would be one and that's called - that's called 3 and so on and the computers are ways of instantiating abstract objects and their relationships in physical objects and their motion so now what happens with quantum computers is that we simply take the deepest physical theory have quantum theory and we say what kind of information processing does quantum theory in general allow and what does it not allow and that's the theory of quantum computation
<and when you do that what do you find compared with a classical computer when you make this quantum computer?
>you find the you find a number of similarities and we find the reasons why the Turing Theory worked as well as it did and then you find a number of dramatic differences between the quantum theory of quantum computers and and classical computers the one that's got the most attention is that for certain types of calculation the quantum computer can perform it exponentially faster than any classical computer so you could have the people haven't built quantum computers yet but we hope that they soon will and when when a quantum computer is built a small quantum computer with with a few thousand qubits that that's the quantum analog of bits
<compared to the billions of bits in our normal desktop
>yes or even our or even our mobile in other words a very very weak comparatively weak quantum computer could could perform more computation simultaneously than could be performed by the entire visible universe if it was all made into computers in fact when I say more that's an understatement it exponentially more than that but only for certain types of computation and that's a token of the fact that the whole notion of computation is different in quantum computers it's not that like with all classical computers you can say that one computer is ten times as fast as the other with quantum computers they are vastly faster than classical computers for some more computations and the same for others and interestingly they're not slower for any computations because the quantum computer among its abilities is to simulate a classical computer
list


uhhhh… Cockshott bros?
>>

 No.338379

>>338298
>science itself is unfalsifiable
Everything else you've written is irrelevant. Science isn't falsifiable because it doesn't even enter the category of things which are falsifiable. Science doesn't make any claims beyond defining itself and thus what does or doesn't constitute science.
You act like science is some kind of ideology but you're wrong, there's a name for that already and it's called scientism. Save your next wall of text for them, thanks.
>>

 No.338381

>>338298
>Its extremely common among research scientists and engineers who are often working with applications of science and don't understand the fundamentals of their own field.
It is funny that The El Greco Fallacy shows so many effects in empirical perceptions research to be totally illusory. I have seen people in other fields employ some care not to fall into the same trap– in Weinberg's book on Cosmology and Gravitation he says "of course, we cannot measure the gravitational time dilation without placing two clocks in different locations because gravity will otherwise slow the reference clock just as much as the test clock." Or in Moby-Dick when Ishmael notes that there is nothing in this world that is what it is except by contrast.
>>

 No.338390

>>338304
If you think that Hegel thinks that (A=B) = (A!=B), then you're wrong
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 No.338391

>>338379
>Science doesn't make any claims beyond defining itself and thus what does or doesn't constitute science.
"Did you do it, Popper? Did you solve the demarcation problem?"
"Yes."
"What did it cost?"
"Everything."
>>

 No.338394

>>338379
>it's called scientism
Yes, glad you understand.
>>

 No.338396

>>338308
Your claim is and I quote:
>"Your opinion" is that unfalsifiable claims are unscientific. That is merely an opinion.
This is merely an opinion. I know this because you're unable to prove how you know that unfalsifiable claims can be scientific.
>>

 No.338397

>>338390
What is it then? pls assist
>>

 No.338398

>>338396
>I know this because you're unable to prove how you know that unfalsifiable claims can be scientific.
How could my (presumed, mind you) inability to prove you wrong settle the matter of whether an opinion you hold is in fact an opinion?
>>

 No.338403

>>338390
What does Hegel meant by contradiction then?
>>

 No.338404

>>338403
(A=!A)?
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 No.338409

File: 1624659121027.png ( 19.71 KB , 612x149 , bruh.png )

>>

 No.338410

>>338404
that's not a contradiction
system of equations
A = B
A = C
A = !A

no contradiction
>>

 No.338411

>>338404
Well that's pretty easy to accept. If I take a magnifying glass to my monitor I can discern that the A on the left is lit up by different pixels than the A on the right.
(trotsky actually wrote this lmfao https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1939/12/abc.htm )
>>

 No.338413

>>338409
This is not a very productive conversation. I'm not having an enjoyable time speaking with you so I think I'll terminate our correspondence.
>>

 No.338414

File: 1624659489267.png ( 662.58 KB , 746x622 , facepalm.png )

>>338413
Alright anon, take care.
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 No.338421

>>337785
this is exactly the point of my animism comment anon
worker liberation cannot happen before a serious purge of subjectivists in academics is carried out

>>338304
this is why "tension" is a better word than "contradiction" when it comes to dialectics
>>

 No.338427

>>338394
Did I claim anywhere that science is the only source of truth?
>>

 No.338441

>>338427
I don't know who you are but people in this thread have and so does Cockshott.
>>

 No.338442

>>336938
>Hegelian socdem
How does that work?
>>

 No.338444

>>338441
>and so does Cockshott
Show me where he says that science is the only source of truth.
>>

 No.338449

>>338444
What do you think this thread is about?
>>

 No.338454

>>338449
Irrelevant. Can you show me where he says it or not?
>>

 No.338456

>>338421
>>336272

This doesn't even make sense. Maybe you should do it without sarcasm.
>>

 No.338513

File: 1624661737566-0.png ( 79.14 KB , 1055x415 , ClipboardImage.png )

File: 1624661737566-1.png ( 42.85 KB , 696x524 , ClipboardImage.png )

File: 1624661737566-2.png ( 38.36 KB , 1144x304 , WORSTANSWER.png )

>>338454
He never says it directly, this is the most frustrating part of this conversation. He seems to believe that stating his assumptions out loud gives ammunition to his enemies and doesn't want to open that avenue of critique. Instead of engaging in hyptotheticals that would expose him he always redirects the conversation

>>338298
>Physicalists don't consider this and focus on rejecting that the world is red and start going into descriptions of em wavelengths

This is his classic move, someone asks him something and he starts describing reality, his entire video on platonic idealism is like this. Cell biology is completely besides the point, but he thinks that padding his argument with examples somehow refutes the question.

>>337918
https://paulcockshott.wordpress.com/2020/04/28/please-waste-no-time-on-hegel/#comment-15336

same with him rambling about cat DNA or his dog mollies anatomy. He constantly implies that not only is science the only way to truth but the NOTHING ELSE EXISTS and he consistently refuses to acknowledge statements that contain those references.
>>

 No.338535

>>338454
In the video on Hegel and Plato iirc the first thing he says is that you cannot find proof of dialectics in nature
>>

 No.338545

>>338513
>He never says it directly
As I thought, this was just your opinion based on intuition.
>He seems to believe that stating his assumptions out loud gives ammunition to his enemies and doesn't want to open that avenue of critique.
>Instead of engaging in hyptotheticals that would expose him he always redirects the conversation
>He constantly implies that not only is science the only way to truth
Your assumptions are irrelevant.
Ask him the question directly and repeat if necessary: "Is science the only source of truth?"
Otherwise, opinion discarded.
>>338535
That's nowhere near the same thing as claiming that science is the only source of truth.
>>

 No.338559

>>338545
He doesn't have to explicitly claim it, that is how he argues. This is your brain on pseudo falsifiability
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 No.338622

>>338545
>As I thought, this was just your opinion based on intuition.

Yeah sure I'm fine with admitting that. I expected you to split hairs over knowledge vs truth. Its less important what he thinks and more what effect it has on others, which judging from the comments on his youtube, blog and on this board its obviously easy for people to think its an endorsement of scientism.
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 No.338637

>>338456
I am not being sarcastic. subjectivism is bourgeois
>>

 No.338646

>>338559
>>338622
All I've noticed from those replies is that Cockshott is a scientist, not a proponent of scientism. But feel free to join the ranks of Hayek and Feyerabend in comparing scientists to ideologues if that's what you want.
>Its less important what he thinks and more what effect it has on others, which judging from the comments on his youtube, blog and on this board its obviously easy for people to think its an endorsement of scientism.
Yet again, opinion discarded.
>>

 No.338649

>Artsy-fartsies think that scientific discovery has nothing to do with intuition and induction, it's all about cold analytics and shit.
You have no monopoly on creativity. None.
>>

 No.338650

>>338637
You wan't to expand on that? Are you just subscribing to Cockshotts interpretation that subjects are a legal category or do you have more? What are you referring to with the word "I" When you say
>I am not being sarcastic
>>

 No.338781

>>338649
Lol no one has implied this, what are you so insecure about
>>338646
I disagree, he is a scientistic scientist, in exactly the ideological sense as many leftists have described of scientism
>>

 No.338827

>>338781
If all you have are gut feelings and interpretations then why should I even bother arguing against you. Intuition isn't enough anon, sometimes you have to actually confirm that shit really do be the way it is. At least attempt to confront him about it directly.
>>

 No.338987

>>338827
This is like asking a liberal to confront capitalism. You will say crime is caused by poverty and they will say crime is caused by individuals who make criminal choices.
>>

 No.339063

>>338987
>You will say crime is caused by poverty and they will say crime is caused by individuals who make criminal choices.
I see no contradiction here.
>>

 No.339166

File: 1624679290343.png ( 180.74 KB , 728x546 , ClipboardImage.png )

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 No.339233

>>338827
>Cockshott must declare that science is the only way to truth for us to know that his comments about philosophy are empiricist
>all else is gut feelings and intuition
Retarded, sage
>>

 No.339292

>hurr durr impiricism
Do I understanding this right, that some idealists are butthurt that you need to test your theories against reality to validate them?
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 No.339305

File: 1624685018590.mp4 ( 11.19 MB , 640x480 , Anons Discover a Book.mp4 )

>>339233
I was responding to accusations of Cockshott promoting scientism, you moron.
You can improve your reading comprehension skills by opening up a book.
>>

 No.339309

>>339292
There is a difference between the flawed influence of empiricism on a work/somebody's thought processes, and using empirical data. Marx, Engels and Lenin were against naive empircism, but all three could not have completed their theoretical works without (Marx in particular while writing Capital) poring over reams of data.

Lenin tells us Marx "took one of the economic formations of society – the system of commodity production – and on the basis of a vast mass of data which he studied for not less than twenty-five years) gave a most detailed analysis of the laws governing this formation and its development."
>>

 No.339317

>>338390
>>338304
But Hegel and dialecticians and Marxists all recognised that formal logic has limitations, and that the law of noncontradiction is necessary but limited. Trotsky is retarded but he's exactly right about this in dialectics:

>The axiom ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’ appears on one hand to be the point of departure for all our knowledge, on the other hand the point of departure for all the errors in our knowledge. To make use of the axiom of ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’ with impunity is possible only within certain limits. When quantitative changes in ‘A’ are negligible for the task at hand then we can presume that ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’. This is, for example, the manner in which a buyer and a seller consider a pound of sugar. We consider the temperature of the sun likewise. Until recently we consider the buying power of the dollar in the same way. But quantitative changes beyond certain limits become converted into qualitative. A pound of sugar subjected to the action of water or kerosene ceases to be a pound of sugar. A dollar in the embrace of a president ceases to be a dollar. To determine at the right moment the critical point where quantity changes into quality is one of the most important and difficult tasks in all the spheres of knowledge including sociology.
>>

 No.339327

>>339317
All you've managed to do by showing me this quote is make me realize how stupid Trotsky actually was.
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 No.339336

File: 1624686283626.jpg ( 55.14 KB , 728x546 , rest-in-piss.jpg )

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 No.339340

File: 1624686463440.png ( 164.13 KB , 681x648 , MaoistvsAW.png )

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 No.339345

>>339317
>and that the law of noncontradiction is necessary but limited
yes, it limits dialectical theoretician from pulling shit out of his ass

>that trotsky quote

wtf is that idiot blabbering about? A is a variable, a symbolic representation, in A = A, there are no two different A's, it is the same fucking variable
holy shit some old marxists were retarded
>>

 No.339352

>>339327
Is Engels as retarded as Trotsky then, according to you?

>True, so long as we consider things as at rest and lifeless, each one by itself, alongside and after each other, we do not run up against any contradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly common to, partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but which in the last-mentioned case are distributed among different objects and therefore contain no contradiction within. Inside the limits of this sphere of observation we can get along on the basis of the usual, metaphysical mode of thought. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can only come about through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is.


This isn't just a "tension" or whatever, motion is an empirical contradiction.

>>339345
You obviously have no idea what the law of noncontradiction means in the first place. Go back to school
>>

 No.339353

>>339352
More again from Engels in a draft of Dialectics of Nature, probably directly influencing the aforequoted Trotsky text:

>The law of identity in the old metaphysical sense is the fundamental law of the old outlook: a=a. Each thing is equal to itself. Everything was permanent, the solar system, stars, organisms. This law has been refuted by natural science bit by bit in each separate case, but theoretically it still prevails and is still put forward by the supporters of the old in opposition to the new: a thing cannot simultaneously be itself and something else. And yet the fact that true, concrete identity includes difference, change, has recently been shown in detail by natural science (see above).


>Abstract identity, like all metaphysical categories, suffices for everyday use, where small dimensions or brief periods of time are in question; the limits within which it is usable differ in almost every case and are determined by the nature of the object; for a planetary system, where in ordinary astronomical calculation the ellipse can be taken as the basic form for practical purposes without error, they are much wider than for an insect that completes its metamorphosis in a few weeks. (Give other examples, e.g., alteration of species, which is reckoned in periods of thousands of years.) For natural science in its comprehensive role, however, even in each single branch, abstract identity is totally inadequate, and although on the whole it has now been abolished in practice, theoretically it still dominates people’s minds, and most natural scientists imagine that identity and difference are irreconcilable opposites, instead of one-sided poles which represent the truth only in their reciprocal action, in the inclusion of difference within identity.
>>

 No.339354

>>339352
>>339345
Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao all wrote on three laws of dialectics and agreed with Trotsky.

Unity and Contradiction of opposites.
Quantity into Quality.
Negation of the Negation.
>>

 No.339360

>>339352
>You obviously have no idea what the law of noncontradiction means in the first place.
it apparently means some nonsense

>Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao all wrote on three laws of dialectics and agreed with Trotsky.

Stalin and Mao were theorylets.
Engels and Lenin were engaged in philosophical masturbation and exercise in futility. I blame German philosophic tradition.
>>

 No.339362

>>338421
>this is why "tension" is a better word than "contradiction" when it comes to dialectics
You're right to introduce the term "tension" to refer to some kind of inherent conflict between things (unity of opposites), but you're wrong to reject A!=A contradictions within dialectics (if that's what you're doing).
I think Lenin calls tensions "subjective contradictions" and then A!=A contradictions "objective contradictions" somewhere.
>>

 No.339363

>>339360
>it apparently means some nonsense

A = A and A != A isn't simply some maths equation, A doesn't mean a "fucking variable " as you put it. They mean that real things are equal to themselves or not equal to themselves at any given point in time. You're obviously being intentionally obtuse, the law of identity etc goes back to Aristotle.
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 No.339370

>>339363
>A = A and A != A isn't simply some maths equation, A doesn't mean a "fucking variable " as you put it.
why do you use mathematical notation then? if an equal sign doesn't mean a formal equivalence, then don't fucking use mathematical notation, because you only confusing the topic

>They mean that real things are equal to themselves or not equal to themselves at any given point in time.

so they mean some vague bullshit, okay

>you're obviously being intentionally obtuse, the law of identity etc goes back to Aristotle.

but you're not using formal equivalence, idiot! the law of identity is about formal equivalence!
You're bouncing between formal and "dialectical" logic whatever you see feet, you dishonest fuck
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 No.339372

>>339370
*fit lol
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 No.339376

File: 1624688492104.png ( 580.54 KB , 1144x849 , ClipboardImage.png )

>>339292
>idealists
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 No.339378

>>339370
You're just manufacturing outrage and misunderstanding over nothing. Firstly, what do you mean by formal equivalence? I take "A = A" to mean "This thing is equal to itself" - an apple is an apple.

>so they mean some vague bullshit, okay

What makes it vague? It's simply the recognised meaning of the law of identity.

>You're bouncing between formal and "dialectical" logic whatever you see feet, you dishonest fuck

I agree with this - I said previously that the law of noncontradiction etc are limited and only work under certain conditions/within certain limits. As Engels says in quote above:

>Abstract identity, like all metaphysical categories, suffices for everyday use, where small dimensions or brief periods of time are in question; the limits within which it is usable differ in almost every case and are determined by the nature of the object
>>

 No.339381

File: 1624688821253-0.png ( 565.22 KB , 1139x842 , ClipboardImage.png )

File: 1624688821253-1.png ( 540.41 KB , 1128x825 , ClipboardImage.png )

File: 1624688821253-2.png ( 522.34 KB , 1172x811 , ClipboardImage.png )

>>339292
>>338637
and you too >>339305

==MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM. Critical Comments on a
Reactionary Philosophy==
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-14.pdf

Lenin doesn't just call vulgar materialism "idealist" he calls it solipsism.

>inb4 i dont do muh sensations

thats exactly what denying a subject mediating between consciousness and matter is: pure idealism
>>

 No.339385

>>339378
You told us "logic has limitations guise, let me show u" and ended up copying and pasting quotes about dialectics. How does that prove anything?
What exactly do you think formal logic is used for? Do you think David Attenborough has to devise a logical proof for the script of every nature documentary he's in? Was On the Origin of Species just a pamphlet with propositional calculus?
Do you think I'm critiquing the limitations of Coca Cola when I say that you like to snort coke?

>>339381
That was Lenin's worst work and was based almost entirely on a misreading of Mach. Read Encounters with Lenin.
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 No.339386

>>339384
Pretty sure its his best work and you sound like an anti-communist liberal.
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 No.339389

File: 1624689251412.mp4 ( 2.77 MB , 854x480 , A does NOT equal A.mp4 )


>>339360
>Stalin and Mao were theorylets.

RADLIB DETECTED
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 No.339390

>>339340
Link? I tried searching for this post and couldn't find it.
>>

 No.339391

>>339378
>Firstly, what do you mean by formal equivalence?
Formal equivalence means that A represents the same variable in a system of equations.

>What makes it vague?

>real things are equal to themselves or not equal to themselves
so are "real" things equal or not?

>I agree with this - I said previously that the law of noncontradiction etc are limited and only work under certain conditions/within certain limits.

so when formal logic twists a dialectical theoretician's arms with its silly requirements of non contradictory statements, you just switch to "dialectical logic"?
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 No.339392

>>339385
>What exactly do you think formal logic is used for? Do you think David Attenborough has to devise a logical proof for the script of every nature documentary he's in? Was On the Origin of Species just a pamphlet with propositional calculus? Do you think I'm critiquing the limitations of Coca Cola when I say that you like to snort coke?
I'm sure that if I knew what this nonsense meant it would be funny

>>339385

>You told us "logic has limitations guise, let me show u" and ended up copying and pasting quotes about dialectics. How does that prove anything?

Did you bother to read them? They tell you exactly what the limitations are. Things are always changing, thus the metaphysical "abstract [law of] identity" (as Engels calls it) is limited to instants of time. It can't deal with the world as it actually exists (constantly changing throughout *time*) - it treats the world as static and unchanging.

Try and explain to me how motion is possible while staying true to the law of noncontradiction.
>>

 No.339395

>>339391
>so when formal logic twists a dialectical theoretician's arms with its silly requirements of non contradictory statements, you just switch to "dialectical logic"?
Depending on what we're talking about, literally yes. Dialectics as perfected by Hegel is a higher form of logic that both stands on the shoulders of and supersedes formal logic.
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 No.339397

File: 1624689726890.png ( 514.09 KB , 572x421 , 007.png )

>>339395
>Dialectics as perfected by Hegel is a higher form of logic that both stands on the shoulders of and supersedes formal logic.
Is this bait?
>>

 No.339398

Dialectics is not the study of change based on the relationship between two concepts, but the study of the self-development of concepts. Formal logic cannot grasp this, but limits its understanding of the concept to the extent the concept is identical to itself. In formal logic change can only arise from relations between concepts. In dialectics, it is possible to grasp change as part of the concept itself.
>>

 No.339399

>>339397
No, why would it be? This is accepted among anyone who has studied Hegel or dialectical materialism and agrees.
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 No.339401

File: 1624689866345.jpg ( 78.39 KB , 355x356 , 1624238434273.jpg )

>>339386
>nooooooo you cant criticize daddy lelnin fucking libtard cuck, everything my daddy says is right noooo
I would tell you to read a fucking book but it looks like reading hasn't helped you much. But you should read it anyways, if you can find ways to cope.
https://archive.org/details/encounterswithle00vale
>>339392
Let me be as clear as possible for you, child: formal logic is not used to "deal with the world". Logic is used to model and test inferences. For example, the statement "If anon doesn't understand logic, then anon is a retarded faggot" can be examined logically.
>>

 No.339404

>>339399
>No, why would it be?
because dialects as you describe it doesn't stands on "the shoulders" of formal logic. It fucking rejects it, rejects the core principle of non contradiction.

>This is accepted among anyone who has studied Hegel or dialectical materialism and agrees.

Cockshott studied it, and he disagrees.
>>

 No.339405

>>339404
>because dialects as you describe it doesn't stands on "the shoulders" of formal logic. It fucking rejects it, rejects the core principle of non contradiction.
You have absolutly no dea what a contradcton s
>Cockshott studied it, and he disagrees
He admtted hmself that he s to retarded to read hegel
>>

 No.339406

>>339401
>formal logic is not used to "deal with the world"
This is just evidently wrong, you condescending little worm. How could you function day-to-day without knowing who you are, without knowing that "me = me"? You don't need to know about muh syllogisms to understand this elementary law, but you still need formal logic to "deal with the world" as you put it. Anyway I don't see how "logic is only used to test inferences" is a response to anything I have said.

>>339404
>Cockshott studied it, and he disagrees.
Hence why I added "and agrees"

>It fucking rejects it, rejects the core principle of non contradiction.

It only rejects it within limits. The law of identity is correct within limits. A plant is equal to itself for a fraction of time, but once you go past this fraction of time the law of identity no longer gives correct results - the plant has changed.
>>

 No.339407

File: 1624690164110.jpeg ( 1.14 MB , 1200x1500 , Bach-1.jpeg )

Marxists define the word "dialectic" without sounding like a religious cultist challenge.
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 No.339409

File: 1624690275923.jpg ( 889.51 KB , 1242x1218 , 1624136802982.jpg )

>>339406
>How could you function day-to-day without knowing who you are, without knowing that "me = me"? You don't need to know about muh syllogisms to understand this elementary law, but you still need formal logic to "deal with the world" as you put it. Anyway I don't see how "logic is only used to test inferences" is a response to anything I have said.
>>

 No.339410

>>339401
Why don't you link the relevant part instead of trying to diverting people from reading communist theory to reading biographies. This author has a hard on for empirio-criticism hes clearly neutral and we can trust his word lol.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolai_Valentinov
>>

 No.339412

>>339404
>because dialects as you describe it doesn't stands on "the shoulders" of formal logic. It fucking rejects it, rejects the core principle of non contradiction.

It doesn't. You seem to be reacting emotionally as if your defending yourself. No one here is saying Cockshott is a bad scientist or if you agree with him you should be cancelled. We are not trying to abandon science. Science and dialectics are mutually compatible and your feelings are not under threat. Please calm down.
>>

 No.339417

>>339414
thank you for new copypasta
>>

 No.339418

>>339406
>A plant is equal to itself for a fraction of time, but once you go past this fraction of time the law of identity no longer gives correct results - the plant has changed.
The law of identity is about symbolic mathematical representations. Obviously no two plants are identical, but that doesn't mean that the law of identity is no longer valid.

>the law of identity no longer gives correct results - the plant has changed

the law of identity stood empirical testing countless times from the time immemorial, all of the engineering calculations are possible because of this law, do you see bridges falling left and right?
>>

 No.339419

>>339418
>The law of identity is about symbolic mathematical representations
I don't know if I'd consider them "mathematical" but otherwise, nobody has said to the contrary.

>no two plants are identical

I'm not talking about two plants, I'm talking about the same plant which changes (by a single atom, for example) in a time period. After this time period, the law of identity is no longer valid.

>the law of identity stood empirical testing countless times from the time immemorial, all of the engineering calculations are possible because of this law, do you see bridges falling left and right?

No, because the law of identity and formal logic that flows on from it to help build the bridge is fine WITHIN this limit. This is an irrelevant example, no Marxist or dialectician is claiming that formal logic is bullshit unequivocally. I think you just misunderstand "our" position
>>

 No.339422

SO HOW 'BOUT THAT COCKSHOTT EH?
>>

 No.339423

>>339418
To add to my previous response - your response contains exactly the limits I'm talking about. Engineers, as far as I know, use predefined tolerance levels, or limits, as to the accuracy of their measurements or constructions or calculations. In this case, A is equal to A (a measurement is equal to its reality) within a certain limit, but once we go past this limit (quantity turning into quality, even), A is no longer equal to A. Simple.
>>

 No.339427

>>339410
Most of what that you need to worry about is in the conclusion, so I'll summarize the rest of the book for you:
>my uygha Valentinov meets Lenin
>homies form an instant bond
>they do squats talk about how to get swole
>the bromance be so strong that Krupskaya gets jealous
>Valentinov and Plekhanov debate empirocriticism
>Plekhanov tattles to Lenin
>bromance ended
>Valentinov gives Lenin a books by Mach and Avenarius
>Lenin chimps out
>monkey see monkey do
>hours long screaming matches
>same shit happens the day after
>Valentinov says fuck this shit i'm out
It's an interesting read. Obviously empiriocriticism was a dead end, but Lenin was basically philosophically stunted aside from his wealth of knowledge about Marx, so they ended up arguing past eachother a lot. After Lenin read Hegel they reconciled their friendship, but by that time he was in poor health.
>>

 No.339429

>>339419
>I'm talking about the same plant which changes (by a single atom, for example) in a time period. After this time period, the law of identity is no longer valid.
for change you have differential calculus
in principle, you can model this plant atom by atom and how it changes

>No, because the law of identity and formal logic that flows on from it to help build the bridge is fine WITHIN this limit.

now you just arbitrary setting some "limits" of applicability
you didn't show how formal logic is no longer applicable, because newsflash, formal logic can cope with change
>>

 No.339433

>>339423
>but once we go past this limit (quantity turning into quality, even), A is no longer equal to A. Simple.
Nope, you can get as much precision as your instruments allow you, or as much as you reasonably need. It doesn't follow that beyond a certain limit there applies some dialectical logic or something.
>>

 No.339439

>>339433
>It doesn't follow that beyond a certain limit there applies some dialectical logic or something.
It does follow that the law of identity doesn't apply past this limit. As you say, you can get as much precision as "you reasonably need", why is why bridges aren't falling. Beyond these limits, dialectical logic applies

.>>339429
>now you just arbitrary setting some "limits" of applicability
They're not arbitrary. As I said in the example, the plant changes by a single atom after a certain time (let's call it x), and the law no longer applies. This is the limit of the law of identity IN THIS particular case, since obviously the limits differ from example to example - as Engels says, "the limits within which it is usable differ in almost every case and are determined by the nature of the object."

>formal logic can cope with change

Elaborate please

>differential calculus

Another example of dialectical logic transcending formal, static logic in certain cases once limitations were met. Integral and differential calculus were introduced to overcome this limit. As Engels says, "the differential calculus for the first time makes it possible for natural science to represent mathematically processes and not only states: motion"
>>

 No.339456

>>339406
>>339409
"me" doesn't exist its just a symbolic pointer used to designate a set of atoms. "I" have to use language conventions to communicate to "you" but you don't exist, only atoms exist, objectively. Subjectivism is idealism.
>>

 No.339458

>>339456
>"I" have to use language conventions to communicate to "you" but you don't exist, only atoms exist, objectively.
impotent reductionism
emergent properties is a thing
>>

 No.339460

>>339381
Cockshott explicitly argues against empirio-criticism and even cites Materialism and Empirio-Criticism in this video as an example. He argues strongly against empirio-criticism throughout his entire video series on materialism.
>>

 No.339466

>>339439
this collection of atoms agrees with you, lets go for a fully materialist language
>>339458
>reductionism
the battle cry of the pseuds
>>

 No.339469

What was Althussers stand on this whole issue?
>>

 No.339477

>>338298
>Saying that consciousness is an emergent hallucination caused by physical atoms going through a mechanical process is exactly the same as saying that humans are brains in vats
No, it isn't really. You can acknowledge that consciousness is illusory while acknowledging that there is a reality behind it; that is, that it had to emerge from brains in an environment, and that it isn't something independent of that environment. Every attempt to take "consciousness isn't real" to "brains in a vat" has to utilize some sleight-of-hand to explain to us why our sense-information should be wildly out of tune with their interpretation of reality. The simpler explanation is that the world is largely what we do perceive it as - that we exist in a space with other organisms and objects we can touch and see and so on. It doesn't require us to believe that the sense data IS reality, to assert that there is such a thing as reality. The assertion that there is a reality is the first and necessary starting point for any of us to have a meaningful conversation about existence. What we think or sense has nothing to do with FUNDAMENTAL reality - in fact, reality doesn't have a "fundamental" logical construction that is hidden by sense-experience or matter. Reality is what it is, regardless of what we think or sense. Obviously our sense-information is always incomplete.

There is a sleight of hand here - first that Hegelians posit that reality is "not computable", and then simultaneously that there is a hidden idea accessible to those with esoteric knowledge, the mythical "hypercomputation". All of this suggests a belief that human thought and reality are fused at a fundamental level, but our experience of the world - and this should be self-evident - is that what we think and sense is very clearly an imperfect understanding of the real. It is not that matter is obstructing a view of the hidden reality, but that our own thought processes are imperfect and we are not omniscient. Rather than accept this potential that human experience is limited and will always be limited in some way, it is essential for the pretenses of the philosopher that philosophy offers this meta-knowledge to those who are initiated into the priesthood. They have no such meta-knowledge, but for those who seek to command perceptions of reality, they must present themselves as if they do have this ability.

Anyway, the point is that "mind" is a wholly separate thing from "matter", and mind only really exists where there is some physical process resembling the logic. In our sense-experience, we can only ever build models of the world based on our ability to process information. We identify objects, relations between them, etc. and can do so to a very fine degree and observe general laws of motion. No one would assume that the theory itself IS the reality, imposing itself on the physical matter. But in all of our models of the universe, we can only ever work with logical propositions. A must be A, must not be B, and there is no middle ground. All of our understanding of the world is in this prison of logic, because that is all "mind" is capable of processing, or our processing is reducible to those logical propositions if we are to model how we think. There is no other way we could dissect the world for our own brains to process, except to break it down to logical propositions. Even if you broke down information to a wavelength or some non-digital form of information, for us to understand that information requires making logical propositions about its nature, and it can be broken down ultimately into many true-false statements. The obvious problem with that is that there is no reason why anything should exist, and if we accept causality, something cannot emerge out of nothing; nor can we assert through language that there is something fundamental at all in the universe that serves as a building block, except "reality" itself. Our starting point has to be that there is a reality to observe before we can even dissect its constituent parts. All of our definitions of any "fundamental reality" are contingent on other definitions, ad infinitum. Describing reality as "atoms moving through the universe like billiard balls" is not really getting at what reality is, and isn't even a particularly useful understanding of physics. We can make the assertion that matter is comprised of particles, atoms, etc. because we have repeated experiments many times over and found relations between substances, but this is something different from the claim that "the universe is fundamentally made of the atom", as if our investigation of matter ends with a simple assertion of atoms.

My final point then is that consciousness is not something special or "fundamental to the universe" in any way, and this is a dangerous fallacy that has caused untold damage. It is not entirely "illusory" in the sense that our sense-experience is arbitrary - we exist as brains in bodies in a environment because those conditions emerged somehow, and this corresponds to us having a consciousness. The very concept of "self", "existence", and so on is how the matter that comprises our body is able to integrate all that into "me", as opposed to the rest of the world. We necessarily integrate all the constituent parts of our body and our property, the tools we use, and we also integrate our very real relations to each other and other objects in the universe. It would be impossible for "us" to exist without consciousness, and it would be unlikely for anything like animals to exist without some corresponding experience. In the end, though, no force from above actually cares what we think or feel, nor does consciousness provide especial insights or gifts simply because "mind" has any special properties at all. Consciousness and sense-experience are not contingent on reaching an arbitrary level of computational complexity - all evidence suggests that humans are not particularly advanced as a computers at all, and that the development of the human brain over the past few hundred thousand years was not an instantaneous process, gifted to us by a genetic God. It is far more likely that our very experience of consciousness has changed considerably over the course of human existence, to say nothing about the development of individual people throughout their lives.
>>

 No.339481

>>339439
>Beyond these limits, dialectical logic applies
it doesn't follow, precision of instruments increased constantly with the technological progress, and formal logic still applies

>the plant changes by a single atom after a certain time (let's call it x), and the law no longer applies

I don't see how in principle we can't have a perfect model describing a plant
and even if we can't have a perfect model because of some fundamental indeterminism of the universe, I don't see why we can't have a model describing a particular plant as accurately as we reasonably need, AND even if can't model a plant with acceptable accuracy, it doesn't follow that there applies some other logic beyond the limits of formal logic

>Elaborate please

statistical mechanics is all about change and they use systems of differential equations

>Another example of dialectical logic transcending formal, static logic in certain cases once limitations were met. Integral and differential calculus were introduced to overcome this limit.

So formal logic overcame this limit after all?

>"the differential calculus for the first time makes it possible for natural science to represent mathematically processes and not only states: motion"

differential calculus is about change, yes. so?
>>

 No.339484

>>338377
A quantum computer is always going to remain theoretical. It sounds great, but actually manipulating individual particles as needed is beyond any known process. The logical computers we use are still using many, many atoms to form the logical gates we need for computation, and far more electricity than is necessary for computation to happen.
>>

 No.339491

File: 1624694644258.png ( 1 MB , 1133x551 , ClipboardImage.png )

>>339427
>they ended up arguing past eachother a lot

Thats what I'm getting so far. It sounds like this guy hasn't read Hegel or Kant and is super concerned about Lenin's tone, not really useful. Hes psychologizing and not discussing the content of the book, its more of a criticism of soviet bureaucracy.
>>

 No.339493

>>339484
>A quantum computer is always going to remain theoretical.

So is a Universal Turing Machine.
>>

 No.339499

>>339493
That's the point. The Turing Machine was a theoretical construct used in a mathematical proof. It's not saying "the universe is fundamentally computation" - it's saying something about logical systems that we construct and what they are capable of and not capable of, and that human thought is not fundamentally different from the Turing Machine.
>>

 No.339500

>>339481
>precision of instruments increased constantly with the technological progress

Except you actually can't measure things on an atomic level without effecting them, which changes their state and violates identity. Thats why people keep bringing up quantum, its not because of woo.
>>

 No.339516

>>339493
>>339499
>>339500
Addendum: No computation is actually possible without some physical process underlying it. As it turns out, the most basic logical gates that you would use for information processing are more complex than a single atom signaling "0" or "1". This limitation would apply to a quantum computer just as much as current computers. There are realistic limits to computability, and how much computation can break down some observed phenomena in a model.
>>

 No.339521

>>339477
>It doesn't require us to believe that the sense data IS reality, to assert that there is such a thing as reality.
I completely agree.

>Anyway, the point is that "mind" is a wholly separate thing from "matter", and mind only really exists where there is some physical process resembling the logic. In our sense-experience, we can only ever build models of the world based on our ability to process information. We identify objects, relations between them, etc. and can do so to a very fine degree and observe general laws of motion. No one would assume that the theory itself IS the reality, imposing itself on the physical matter.

Yes, exactly. But people DO confuse the map for the territory, and they are doing it in this thread right now.
>>

 No.339523

>>339469
Something about a knife? Or maybe it rhymes with knife? I cant remember.
>>

 No.339529

>>339523
Wtf are you on about?
>>

 No.339536

>>339491
If you wanted to read the actual debates between Lenin and Valentinov then read chapters 10 and 11.
>>

 No.339538

>>339500
so dialectical logic is a quantum level logic? I dunno, this observer effect business just seems to me as inadequacy of measuring instruments.
Anyway, on the macro level formal logic reigns supreme
>>

 No.339541

>>339529
I think he is talking about Althusser and his wife.
>>

 No.339543

>>339541
He strangled her and didn't use a knife. Weak attempt at being funny. He did write about a lot about logic, hegel and philosophy of science so why isn't he mentioned in this thread?
>>

 No.339545

>>339538
What types of logic do even exist except "formal logic"?
>>

 No.339547

>>336051
Some guy actually made a response video.

Is Hegel a Waste of Time? A Response to Paul Cockshott
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=12Yi9jNPSq4
>>

 No.339548

>>339538
> inadequacy of measuring instruments
>neuroscience will prove the mind is in the brain soon, just have faith!
lol your doing reverse god of the gaps now
>>

 No.339549

>>339545 (me)
Inductive Logic
Deductive Logic
Informal Logic
Fallacies

Those are the main forms of logic as far as I recall, no? Where does formal logic and dialectics fall inside those four categories?
>>

 No.339550

>>339481
>and even if we can't have a perfect model because of some fundamental indeterminism of the universe, I don't see why we can't have a model describing a particular plant as accurately as we reasonably need
The point isn't nearly as complicated as you seem to think it is. The "fundamental indeterminism" you speak of is simply time passing. A plant soaks up new nutrients within the timespan of a second, a plant grows one of its leafs by a tiny amount in a second, etc. etc. This is simply one example of "A=A" not working once you go past a limit, which would be the time it takes for an atom of the plant to change (for example). I don't really know why you're talking about models and such though, it's just an example to illustrate the inapplicability of identity to nature.

>So formal logic overcame this limit after all?

It's not part of formal logic. Differential calculus is clearly dialectical, Marx recognised this

>differential calculus is about change, yes. so?

So your point about differential calculus being used to account for change is exactly correct, except it vindicates my position.
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 No.339553

File: 1624696388495.png ( 540.41 KB , 1128x825 , ClipboardImage.png )

>>339460
Thats really funny because hes basically a Machist. As I was going over the introduction again I noticed that Berkeley had a peculiar type of positivism with his "matter denial". They weren't saying atoms don't exist, it says as much in the second screenshot, he only denies the word "matter". "the things I touch with my hands do really exist" Hes doing the same thing as the guy saying that "you" are just a collection of atoms, except we know atoms are real now, Berkeley didn't. He was saying what is real is the thing that impacts the apparatus, whether its sensory or technical.
>>

 No.339568

>>339553
I guess you didn't fully read the conclusion then. If you did, you'd find that Lenin's position after reading Hegel ends up being uncomfortably closer to Berkeley and Mach than you'd first imagine.
>>

 No.339581

>>339553
Ah, I misread you, my bad.
>Thats really funny because hes basically a Machist.
Explain.
>>

 No.339591

>>339550
>Differential calculus is clearly dialectical
Calculus is making logical propositions that such things as limits, derivatives, integrals, etc., can be mathematically valid, and gives explanations for how you find the derivative, etc. This concept had sort of existed in the past, though it was never fully formalized.

>This is simply one example of "A=A" not working once you go past a limit

If you want to describe change, you would break down that change into more logical propositions.
There are of course no proper objects that exist metaphysically - physically existing objects can be described as accumulations of smaller phenomena, and this can be repeated endlessly or go in circles. It is entirely possible to understand the objects we use in formal logic and say "this is comprised of B and C, and changes into D or E by such and such process", and it can break down to atoms in which we have a formal system to describe the behavior of them. The question of identity in this philosophy is not about a level of scientific accuracy, and it is a mistake to make the claim that formal logic is scientifically unsound because of measurement errors. It is defeating the point that the German idealists were making. The point was about what it means for something to exist or be at all, not that anything could be anything (although that's what it leads to).
>>

 No.339594

>>339550
>I don't really know why you're talking about models and such though
because we can model change with formal logic

>It's not part of formal logic. Differential calculus is clearly dialectical, Marx recognised this

theory of differential calculus doesn't allow for contradictions, there is nothing dialectic about it
>>

 No.339600

>>339581
Lenin is saying Berkeley, Hume, Mach and a bunch of other people are equivalent because they all believe that matter, or the physical things we perceive through sight and touch or with instruments, are directly accessible to us with no mediation through a subjective observer. He is calling this idealist because it is raising up immediate sense data to the level of actually existing reality. People in this thread are saying that Lenin's position is idealist because he is putting his subjective perspective as primary, but he is not really doing that. He is saying that subjective perspectives are how we gather sense data, and what is primary is what the sense data points to, the thing in itself.

His contemporary opponents said this is needless "duplication of the world", which is similar to Cockshott's rejection of the subject as a vestigial legal term. Because Lenin believes that there is a subject he believes that our perception of objects is an idea, a copy in our mind. Vulgar materialists don't believe in mind, only matter, so to Lenin they only believe in Ideas, thus they are idealists. From this he continues, if they only believe in ideas they can't ground a reality without humans to perceive it, so he concludes that they are solipsists.
>>

 No.339614

>>339600
>Lenin is saying Berkeley, Hume, Mach and a bunch of other people are equivalent because they all believe that matter, or the physical things we perceive through sight and touch or with instruments, are directly accessible to us with no mediation through a subjective observer. He is calling this idealist because it is raising up immediate sense data to the level of actually existing reality.
If that's the case, then Lenin before 1917 was the worst idealist.
>He is saying that subjective perspectives are how we gather sense data, and what is primary is what the sense data points to, the thing in itself.
Lenin ends up siding with Hegel in denying the existence of the thing-in-itself.
>Vulgar materialists don't believe in mind, only matter, so to Lenin they only believe in Ideas, thus they are idealists.
>if they only believe in ideas they can't ground a reality without humans to perceive it, so he concludes that they are solipsists.
See the embedded video.
>>

 No.339618

>>339614
>Lenin ends up siding with Hegel in denying the existence of the thing-in-itself.
Where? What does Lenin say sense data represents then? What am I supposed to look for in this video? Can you explain yourself instead of deflecting?
>>

 No.339627

>>339618
Pages 254-255
I want to you try and directly critique what he says from 11:19 onwards so I have a better idea of what you're talking about.
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 No.339637

File: 1624701754881-0.png ( 11.26 MB , 2500x1875 , 20210626_025812_scrubbed.png )

File: 1624701754881-1.png ( 10.02 MB , 1875x2500 , 20210626_025820_scrubbed.png )

Images so others can follow along.
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 No.339639

>>339614
>Marx claimed was it unique to the architect it's doesn't mean that the bee has a picture in its mind or what it's building but if we use modern computer

> it does have a prior existence before it's put up by the builders but that prior existence is as a plan on paper not in the minds of builders it isn't in the minds of the builders


This just reinforces that what Lenin was saying applies to Cockshott as well. Maybe I misused thing in itself trying to make up for Berkeleys treatment of matter. Why does this make Lenin idealist?
>>

 No.339648

>>339637
This isn't Lenin and it doesn't say what you are saying.
>>

 No.339651

When I circled >>339491
>If one throws out Hegel how much is left of him
from trying to read him as a materialist, its clear that the author doesn't understand Hegel or the dialectic. Reading him as a materialist means analyzing the movement of his logic while substituting the variables for matter instead of spirit.
>>

 No.339655

File: 1624702350944.jpg ( 5.78 KB , 228x221 , 1613084028658.jpg )

>>337918
>Humans are not computers, and can skip computation through recognition, analogy and syllogism. Humans don't have to declare or assign variables to memory slots, they use the universe as a cache of data, and are perfectly capable of synthesizing more information in outputs than received in inputs. Consciousnesses is a higher level emergent type of computation if at all, like encryption or jpg(vs bmp) where the recognition of repeating patterns(or rather the smoothness or jaggedness of a given pattern) and allows reduced data to stand in for a larger whole. Cognition acts like a hash check that also tells you what is inside the file. A computer can't do "2"+"2"= "Four" directly, where a human can without the extra steps. You can't reduce that to a mechanical process. There is at the very least no proof in neuroscience that brain states are actually equivalent to computers, which makes the idea speculative at best.

Many of the assertions in this statement are wrong. this anon is an ignorant brainlet who knows nothing about either computer science or the scientific consensus in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In fact many of the anons responding here are profoundly ignorant of this subject matter and its shown by them bringing up red herrings, objections that were answered decades ago, and rando blogs from cranks who also miss the point. But since this was already covered extensively in the first thread on Hegelianism vs the computational theory I'll leave it be.

Be wary of amateur philosophers who speak with 'great authority' on scientific subjects that they know nothing about. To anyone who has studied these subjects you will immediately recognize the pseudery on display here, but no amount of citations will refute them when you can quote textbooks all day long but they will always find some rando blog or obscuro hack academic with their own pet theories about why the rest of science is wrong.
>>

 No.339661

>>339637
If you mean because it becomes a "thing-for-others", it still refers to the same thing, what is being pointed at. Even more though, dialectically they are literally the same thing, its describing a change from one thing into another.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Parallax_View_(book)#Interpretation
>>

 No.339663

>>339655
>Be wary of amateur philosophers who speak with 'great authority' on scientific subjects that they know nothing about
Eugene in a nutshell
>>

 No.339666

>>339655
Elaborate why they're/which assertions are wrong then.
>>

 No.339667

>>339666
Is the first thread still around? Maybe he can point to some screencaps
>>

 No.339668

>>339666
there was already a 500 post debate about this extensively in the other debate hegel thread and i dont feel like typing it out again
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 No.339669

>>339667
i think it fell off the catalog, maybe someone made an archive
>>

 No.339671

>>339639
>>339648
My apologies, I'm not very good at philosophy. Regardless, entertain me for a moment.
Originally he argues the following (chapter 10):
>A man who builds his philosophy on sensation alone is beyond hope…The external world, the material world, exists outside of us, independently of any perceptions and sensations.. If your Mach does not know this materialist truth, he must be a complete fool.
But then he ends up repudiating this position and repeating Hegel's criticism of the thing-in-itself, IMO most crucially in this line:
>'The thing-in-itself has colour only in relation to the eye, smell in relation to the nose, and so forth.'
Is that not "raising up immediate sense data to the level of actually existing reality?"
>>

 No.339672

>>339655
>some of this is wrong, no I wont tell you what, its in another thread that I'm also not going to link, look at my long list of assertions just trust me bro
>>

 No.339677

>>339669
No it wasn't archived
>>339668
Please type it out. I would like to hear it
>>

 No.339685

>>339668
Pathetic.
>Be wary of amateur philosophers who speak with 'great authority' on scientific subjects that they know nothing about.
I'm fucking wary of you. How could you talk about assertations made in this thread, in a previous thread? Doesn't make any sense. Type out what's wrong with >>337918 or your response is worthless
>>

 No.339691

>>339639
Couldn't one interpret Cockshott as just saying that the mind simply models reality, not that the mind doesn't exist?
>>

 No.339692

>>339671
>Is that not "raising up immediate sense data to the level of actually existing reality?"
It's more that "color" as something to ascribe to objects only exists to us, because we as humans sense color, rather than make a calculation that the wavelength of light emitted from an object is such-and-such. "Color" itself is a limited sensory spectrum of all possible light waves - we don't have many words for various spectra of light outside the visible ones, and we don't describe those wavelengths as "colors" in the same way.
At least, I THINK that is what Lenin is saying. He's making a distinction between how things actually are and how we sense them, in a way that makes sense to his understanding of philosophy. There is enough reason to believe that if one humans sees a red object, then other humans will perceive it as red, and if some alien observer observed the same light waves, they would refer to it as their concept of "red" - IF they conceive of objects as having color in the way that we do, which they might not.
>>

 No.339694

>>339692
And let's say an alien primarily senses through sonar, and its visual senses were secondary, whereas in humans we primarily see and our sense of sound is often secondary in perceiving the universe. That would make the alien's perception of phenomena somewhat different.
And of course, "color" doesn't exist for the blind, and a lot of words we use to describe sound don't make sense to the deaf.
>>

 No.339697

>>339671
Colour is actually one of the classic ways to talk about the mind-body problem, usually 'the experience of the colour red'.

http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/color_and_mind-body_prob.pdf
>>

 No.339704

>>339691
I think he would say that the brain models reality because its evolutionary advantageous to do so and that the mind doesn't exist because ghosts aren't real.
>>

 No.339707

>>339692
Okay. Just out of curiosity, how would you explain the other following notes of his:
>'The thing-in-itself is nothing but an abstraction, void of truth and content.'
>'The thing-in-itself is altogether an empty, lifeless abstraction.'
>>

 No.339712

>>339704
What exactly is the difference between the brain and the mind?
>>

 No.339713

>>339697
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

highly relevant

>In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific apple, this particular apple now".


>Examples of qualia include the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, as well as the redness of an evening sky. As qualitative characters of sensation, qualia stand in contrast to "propositional attitudes",[1] where the focus is on beliefs about experience rather than what it is directly like to be experiencing.


obviously if you don't have a subject you can't have qualia
>>

 No.339717

>>339712
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem

>The mind–body problem is a debate concerning the relationship between thought and consciousness in the human mind, and the brain as part of the physical body. It is distinct from the question of how mind and body function chemically and physiologically, as that question presupposes an interactionist account of mind–body relations.[1] This question arises when mind and body are considered as distinct, based on the premise that the mind and the body are fundamentally different in nature.[1]


>The problem was addressed by René Descartes in the 17th century, resulting in Cartesian dualism, and by pre-Aristotelian philosophers,[2][3] in Avicennian philosophy,[4] and in earlier Asian traditions. A variety of approaches have been proposed. Most are either dualist or monist. Dualism maintains a rigid distinction between the realms of mind and matter. Monism maintains that there is only one unifying reality, substance or essence, in terms of which everything can be explained.
>>

 No.339720

>>

 No.339726

>>339717
I see. But do you think that Cockshott, when he describes which properties are or aren't part of the mind, is separating the mind from the brain to begin with?
>>339720
I understand this, I'm just asking you to interpret the meaning behind Lenin's notes in the context of my previous replies.
>>

 No.339741

>>339726
I think it was well explained earlier in the thread (granted, in my view Lenin is operating in a flawed framework just as much, so my opinion may not mean much).
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 No.339754

File: 1624705273847.gif ( 996.38 KB , 290x231 , Yes yes yes.gif )

>>339741
> so my opinion may not mean much
This
>>

 No.339757

>>339741
Okay, so let me go over this one last time. Again, I apologize for my slowness with regard to philosophy.
1. Are the two following notes by Lenin a repudiation of the thing-in-itself? see >>339707
2. If they aren't, why not?
3. If they are, then how is your interpretation of his other quote correct? In other words, how can color be "ascribed to an object" if it the supposed object doesn't actually exist independently of observation? see >>339692
4. If objects do not exist independently of observation, then isn't that the same as "raising up immediate sense data to the level of actually existing reality?"
5. Finally, how is the following interpretation of Lenin correct if 4 is true? see >>339600
>>

 No.339764

>>339717
I don't understand the problem. Mind is an abstraction layer, an emergent phenomenon of a complex dynamic neural network. I see no reason why every movement of the mind cannot be pinned to some movement in the physical neural net. I know this is a tired analogy, but I think of it like software, an abstraction layer that somehow corresponds to underlying electric currents in the hardware.
>>

 No.339777

>>339757
read pic in >>339637
>>

 No.339783

>>339777
I posted those pictures. Can you respond to my post point-by-point please? I need help with understanding philosophy so please try and be somewhat accommodating.
>>

 No.339787

>>339783
Are you new to this board?
>>

 No.339791

>>339764
You're right, which is why the mind-body problem isn't an actual problem to anyone who isn't a fucking ideologues.

>>339783
I think those images explain better than I could, since I'm not familiar with the particular writing of Lenin's development as a philosopher on this question. He's moving from a strict materialist view to something more informed by Hegel, in which he comes to reject the thing-in-itself (which places his materialism in jeopardy).

I'm going to give Materialism and Empiro-Criticism a read soon because it looks interesting given I go over some of the same subject matter.
>>

 No.339794

>>339787
I don't know, am I?
>>339791
Then wouldn't you agree, to some limited extent at the very least, that Lenin ends up contradicting the very premise of Materialism and Empiro-Criticism?
>>

 No.339796

>>339794
>I don't know, am I?
If you can't answer a yes or no question then you have no hope of understanding philosophy
>>

 No.339799

File: 1624707957990.jpg ( 107.33 KB , 720x733 , 1449216719927.jpg )

>>339796
Aww, dang. That's a real shame…
>>

 No.339810

>>339799
First rule of the board: don't respond to eugenics-kun.
>>

 No.339813

>>339810
ive seen some ok takes from him before
>>

 No.339925

>>339398
>the study of the self-development of concepts

is this similar to the below?


>We can interpret things in society as signs for social relations, “but unless we realize that the social relations thus signified are themselves signs and social constructs defined by categories of thoughts that are the product of society and history, we remain victims of and apologists for the semiotic that we are seeking to understand. (-.9) “to peel off the disguised and fictional quality of our social reality, the analyst has the far harder task of working through the appearance that phenomena acquire, not so much as their symbols, but as the outcome of their interaction with the historically produced categories of thought that have been imposed on them” - Michael Taussig
>>

 No.339934

>>338177
The other poster is right on this. Predictions of the form "X will happen at some point" basically cannot be falsified. You need to add a date to the prediction, "X will happen before this date…", so there is a point in time when people can actually look back and tell whether the prediction has come true or not. Without the date, the prediction not coming true doesn't falsify it.

Basically – Sorry for that weasel word, but there is sort-of an exception to this, namely when things or people that were part of the prediction vanish. Suppose somebody made the prediction in 2016 that John McAfee, inventor of the McAfee anti-virus software, would win the Eurovision Song Contest at some point, not specifying a date here. Now that John McAfee is dead, the prediction is falsified even though it had no date attached. This really isn't a killer-argument against Popper. One can say (and this is also my take) that the prediction with John McAfee did have a time-limit built in, it just wasn't spelled out, it was implicit and this is understood by anybody who isn't a pomo wanker. A prediction that capitalism must give way to communism at some point is not at all like the McAfee prediction, since there's no way to falsify that.

>>339340
Fake.
>>

 No.339980

>>339934
Marx's view though was that the transformation of capitalism to socialism (of some sort) was happening in his lifetime, and he saw in capitalism the tendencies ("contradictions") that would cause this transformation. This got recombobulated into a spooky theory about inevitable victory (a curiously fascist-like trope), but I highly doubt Marx was of the belief that victory of the communist state was imminent and inevitable if you just prayed to the material forces. That's a bastardization of what any revolutionary was trying to accomplish in Marx's lifetime and for some time after. It was a given that if you were interested in Marx, you didn't like the way things were going and wanted something different.

Anyway, the "it has to be falsifiable" thing is a silly argument - never mind that Marx's prediction and his overall theory of class struggle is very falsifiable and can be disputed. Marx's prediction holds if you agree with his assessment of capitalism as a situation and note the same tendencies in capitalism that he did - that at some point, capitalism will have to transform into some other situation, and that the workers had the most potential to affect a revolution due to their position in society. Socialism as a movement had always been premised on an alliance between those in the middle strata that were denied entry into the ranks of the larger bourgeoisie and a large mass of workers (with a possible assist from class renegades), so this formulation was not surprising. The error in this is that the ideologists of those who ruled were not married to liberal capitalism so utterly, but this is not a fault of Marx because Marx and Engels were well aware of bourgeois socialism and criticized it harshly. The conclusion that capitalism is not a perfect and perpetually stable system or situation leads to the conclusion that something, eventually, will displace it, or the situation will become untenable and the result is the ruin of the contending classes (a result Marx noted as a possibility). That follows from the premises of what capitalism is, because capitalism wasn't a situation that was imposed purely out of will by the new capitalists one day and it was not a situation that was perfectly engineered by those who rule. The owning classes themselves were not in this to produce commodities for a market so that commoners could have nice things. Basically, Popper is being a deliberate brainlet to obfuscate the socialist case, which makes sense since he was a fucking neoliberal with the Mont Pelerin assholes. But the point remains, conclusions which logically follow from premises are by definition not falsifiable, if you accept the initial premises. There is a ton of science which follows from premises of other things. You can't say that the logic itself is falsifiable, but you can challenge the premises, or you can challenge the logic's validity. And of course, when you are speaking of something as complex as a human society, or even just individual humans, any good scientist knows not to be too much of a reductionist and make very sweeping declarations about human nature or the teleological destiny of things, and that does throw a wrench in predictions which purport to plot world-history like a conspiracy theory.
>>

 No.340702

>>339707
>>339469
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1969/lenin-before-hegel.htm

Some important and relevant parts:


>I can reduce the paradox of this second fact, of this second declaration of Lenin’s straightaway by pointing out that it is preceded (a page earlier in the Notebooks) by another very interesting formula only a few lines before. Lenin declares, in fact, that ‘Hegel’s analysis of syllogisms … recalls Marx’s imitation of Hegel in Ch. 1’. This is a re-phrasing of Marx’s own diagnosis: his ‘coquetting’ with Hegel. If the cap fits, wear it. This is not me speaking, but Lenin, following Marx. In fact, one cannot understand Volume One Part I at all without completely removing its Hegelian ‘lid’, without reading as a materialist, as Lenin reads Hegel, the said Volume One Part I, without, if you will forgive the presumption, re-writing it.


>This brings us directly to my central thesis on Lenin’s reading of Hegel: i.e. that in his notes on Hegel, Lenin maintains precisely the position he had adopted previously in ‘What the “Friends of the People” Are’ and ‘Materialism and Empirio-criticism’, i.e. at a moment when he had not read Hegel, which leads us to a ‘shocking’ but correct conclusion: basically, Lenin did not need to read Hegel in order to understand him, because he had already understood Hegel, having closely read and understood Marx.


>What is it that Interests Lenin?

>Hegel’s Criticism of Kant
>We should note carefully that when Lenin approves of the fact that Hegel criticizes Kant from a Hegelian viewpoint, he certainly does not approve of the Hegelian viewpoint 100 per cent, but he does approve 100 per cent of the fact that Kant is criticized, and, let us say, approves of a large part of the arguments behind Hegel’s criticism of Kant. This is really an obvious point: it is possible for two people to be in agreement against a third party for different reasons

>For Lenin, as for Hegel, Kant means subjectivism.[1] In a quasi-Hegelian phrase, Lenin says that the transcendental is subjectivism and psychology. And naturally we are not surprised to find that Lenin occasionally compares Kant with Mach. Hence Lenin is in agreement with Hegel in criticizing Kant from the point of view of objectivism …but what objectivism? We shall see.


>In any case, he delights in Hegel’s criticism of the thing-in-itself. An empty notion, he says, in agreement with the Hegelian formulation, it is a myth to claim to be able to think the unknowable, the thing-in-itself is the identity of the essence in the phenomenon.


>In Kant, Ding an sich is an empty abstraction, but Hegel demands abstraction which corresponds to der Sache(the matter) (op. cit., p. 92).


>In this dual theme: the categorical rejection of the thing-in-itself – and its counterpart: the existence of the essence in the phenomenon, which Lenin reads as the identity of the essence and the thing-in-itself (the essence identical with its phenomenon), Lenin is in agreement with Hegel, though the latter would not say that the ‘reality’ of the thing-in-itself is the essence. A shade of meaning perhaps, but an important one.


>Why is it important? Because Hegel’s criticism of Kant is a criticism of subjective idealism in the name of absolute idealism, which means that Hegel does not stop at a Theory of the Essence, but criticizes Kant in the name of a Theory of the Idea, whereas Lenin stops at what Hegel would call a Theory of the Essence.


>Here we see ‘in the name of what’ Lenin criticizes Kant’s subjectivism: in the name of objectivism, I have said. This term is too easily a pendant of the term subjectivism for it not to be immediately suspect. Let us say rather that Lenin criticizes Kant’s subjectivism in the name of a materialist thesis which is a thesis conjointly of (material) existence and of (scientific) objectivity. In other words, Lenin criticizes Kant from the viewpoint of philosophical materialism and scientific objectivity, thought together in the thesis of materialism. This is precisely the position of Materialism and Empirio-criticism.


>But it enables us to reveal a number of important consequences nonetheless. Let us run through them.


>The critique of Kant’s transcendental subjectivism contained in the selective reading in which Lenin ‘lays bare’ Hegel entails:


>1. the elimination of the thing-in-itself and its reconversion into the dialectical action of the identity of essence and phenomenon;


>2. the elimination of the category of the Subject (whether transcendental or otherwise);


>3. with this double elimination and the reconversion of the thing-in-itself into the dialectical action of the essence in its phenomenon, Lenin produces an effect often underlined in Materialism and Empirio-criticism: the liberation of scientific practice, finally freed from every dogma that would make it an ossified thing, thus restoring to it its rightful living existence – this life of science merely reflecting the life of reality itself.[2]


>This is the categorical limit dividing Lenin from Hegel in their criticisms of Kant. For Lenin, Hegel criticizes Kant from the viewpoint of the Absolute Idea, i.e. provisionally, of ‘God’ – whereas Lenin uses Hegel’s criticism of Kant to criticize Kant from the viewpoint of science, of scientific objectivity and its correlate, the material existence of its object.


>This is the practice of laying-bare and peeling, of refining, as we can see it at a point where it is possible: Lenin takes what interests him from his point of view from the discourse which Hegel is pursuing from a quite different point of view. What determines the principle of the choice is the difference in viewpoints: the primacy of science and its material object, for Lenin; whereas, as we know, for Hegel, science, meaning the science of the scientists (which remains in the Intellect), has no primacy: since in Hegel science is subject to the primacy of Religion and Philosophy, which is the truth of Religion.
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 No.341000

>>340702
>What determines the principle of the choice is the difference in viewpoints

>>339353
>theoretically it still dominates people’s minds, and most natural scientists imagine that identity and difference are irreconcilable opposites, instead of one-sided poles which represent the truth only in their reciprocal action, in the inclusion of difference within identity.

What I think Lenin is basically saying here is not that science needs "a subject" but that science needs subjects and that through dialectics multiple subjects can determine an object by negation of themselves. Objects are not concepts, they are the difference between concepts. So you have two people looking at an apple. The first one sees their concept of the apple, and at a slightly different time the second sees their concept of the apple from a different perspective, the apple is determined by what they both don't not see. So the apple is not a dog, a car, a house etc, but you can never say the apple is the apple, because each persons perspective is only a partial model of the whole apple. Two subjective perspectives can determine between them a rate and direction of change. It is kind of like a conceptual calculus, where the absolute is the concept as its process of becoming approaches infinity, where you find its essence by successive removal of all that it is not. As the function progresses some terms drop to zero and the other terms take over to define the shape of the curve. The reason this matters to Lenin is that:
First, he apple is always changing from moment to moment, so you conception of it is never quite accurate.
Second, you can't see the opposite side of the apple, it could be a hollow fake, or we could be in a simulation and the back isn't rendered when you aren't looking.

Together two or more people can compare notes and determine that it does in fact have a back side as is a whole object. If you don't suppose a subject you have no way of knowing the person you are talking to isn't a simulation. Saying there is no subject leads to denying other peoples internal experience, that is why he says it leads to solipsism, and he was proven correct by history. Its quite literally the difference between science and Scientism, where truth is handed down by a designated priest class.

https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/silicon-valley-is-obsessed-with-a-false-notion-of-reality/503963/
also see zizek on why the Nazis adopted eastern religious concepts of "no-self" that denies the subject to justify atrocities and how it compliments liberal capitalism, and its relation to the philosophy of science https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qkTUQYxEUjs

More fundamentally if there is no subject and people are just collections of atoms playing out the laws of physics, if we are just automata then determinism is true and there is no such thing as free will. That would mean there is no point in being a communist and Marx is wrong about everything and the world can not be changed. That is why Lenin was so angry in his book and said that everyone who disagreed with him should go to gulag.
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 No.341277


https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel-dialectics/
>Although the speculative moment negates the contradiction, it is a determinate or defined nothingness because it is the result of a specific process. There is something particular about the determination in the moment of understanding—a specific weakness, or some specific aspect that was ignored in its one-sidedness or restrictedness—that leads it to fall apart in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment has a definition, determination or content because it grows out of and unifies the particular character of those earlier determinations, or is “a unity of distinct determinations” (EL Remark to §82).

>The speculative moment is thus “truly not empty, abstract nothing, but the negation of certain determinations” (EL-GSH §82). When the result “is taken as the result of that from which it emerges”, Hegel says, then it is “in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content” (PhG-M §79). As he also puts it, “the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation [bestimmte Negation]; a new form has thereby immediately arisen” (PhG-M §79). Or, as he says, “[b]ecause the result, the negation, is a determinate negation [bestimmte Negation], it has a content” (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54). Hegel’s claim in both the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic that his philosophy relies on a process of “determinate negation [bestimmte Negation]” has sometimes led scholars to describe his dialectics as a method or doctrine of “determinate negation” (see entry on Hegel, section on Science of Logic; cf. Rosen 1982: 30; Stewart 1996, 2000: 41–3; Winfield 1990: 56).


>There are several features of this account that Hegel thinks raise his dialectical method above the arbitrariness of Plato’s dialectics to the level of a genuine science. First, because the determinations in the moment of understanding sublate themselves, Hegel’s dialectics does not require some new idea to show up arbitrarily.


>Second, because the form or determination that arises is the result of the self-sublation of the determination from the moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside.


>Third, because later determinations “sublate” earlier determinations, the earlier determinations are not completely cancelled or negated.


>The concept of “apple”, for example, as a Being-for-itself, would be defined by gathering up individual “somethings” that are the same as one another (as apples). Each individual apple can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to an “other” that is the same “something” that it is (i.e., an apple). That is the one-sidedness or restrictedness that leads each “something” to pass into its “other” or opposite. The “somethings” are thus both “something-others”. Moreover, their defining processes lead to an endless process of passing back and forth into one another: one “something” can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to another “something” that is the same as it is, which, in turn, can be what it is (an apple) only in relation to the other “something” that is the same as it is, and so on, back and forth, endlessly (cf. EL §95). The concept of “apple”, as a Being-for-itself, stops that endless, passing-over process by embracing or including the individual something-others (the apples) in its content. It grasps or captures their character or quality as apples.
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 No.341325

>>336286
Fuck me for quoting the originals, you moron. Factuality hurts your fee-fees.
>“I always follow in your footsteps”, Marx wrote to Engels in 1864.
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 No.341327

>>336286
>You literally only quotet engels
Literal quote order:
<Engels
<Marx
<E
<M
<E
<M

1/10 troll

Read a book.
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 No.341331

>>339336
very nice edit
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 No.341359

>>339934
>Predictions of the form "X will happen at some point" basically cannot be falsified.
Here is a claim that is not falsifiable: "the muon in the apparatus will eventually decay." That it is not a scientific claim is your opinion. It is not controversial to posit that most people– not only laypeople but also particle physicists– would identify the claim as not non-scientific.
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 No.341505

>>341000
That is a quote from Engels, not Lenin btw.
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 No.341526

>>339594
>theory of differential calculus doesn't allow for contradictions, there is nothing dialectic about it

Let Engels explain it to you, seeing as you deny the existence of contradictions within the logic of mathematics:

>The negation of the negation is even more strikingly obvious in higher analysis, in those “summations of indefinitely small magnitudes” which Herr Dühring himself declares are the highest operations of mathematics, and in ordinary language are known as the differential and integral calculus. How are these forms of calculus used? In a given problem, for example, I have two variables, x and y, neither of which can vary without the other also varying in a ratio determined by the facts of the case. I differentiate x and y, i.e., I take x and y as so infinitely small that in comparison with any real quantity, however small, they disappear, that nothing is left of x and y but their reciprocal relation without any, so to speak, material basis, a quantitative ratio in which there is no quantity. Therefore, dy/dx, the ratio between the differentials of x and y, is dx equal to 0/0 but 0/0 taken as the expression of y/x. I only mention in passing that this ratio between two quantities which have disappeared, caught at the moment of their disappearance, is a contradiction; however, it cannot disturb us any more than it has disturbed the whole of mathematics for almost two hundred years. And now, what have I done but negatex and y, though not in such a way that I need not bother about them any more, not in the way that metaphysics negates, but in the way that corresponds with the facts of the case? In place of x and y, therefore, I have their negation, dx and dy, in the formulas or equations before me. I continue then to operate with these formulas, treating dx and dy as quantities which are real, though subject to certain exceptional laws, and at a certain point I negate the negation, i.e., I integrate the differential formula, and in place of dx and dy again get the real quantities x and y, and am then not where I was at the beginning, but by using this method I have solved the problem on which ordinary geometry and algebra might perhaps have broken their jaws in vain.


https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch11.htm
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 No.341592

>>341526
There's nothing contradictory about the concept of adding an infinite sequence. People did this before differential calculus was formalized, which is how ancients were able to determine the value of pi or square roots.

When you are dealing with mathematics, the very existence of numbers is a logical proposition from the start. You must start with some set theory, and usually this involves the natural numbers (themselves a logical proposition that you can count things and describe the relationship of objects in a group by counting one, two, etc.) which is expanded with a concept of zero, negative numbers, rational numbers, and so on. The whole point of mathematics is that it is formal logic, and there aren't contradictions. Contradictions of the Hegelian type are description of nature and being, not something to be confused with formal logic.
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 No.341601

>>341325
>>341327
Like….sorry but this is just pure projection on your part. I didn't say your post is bad per se, but that it isn't an effortpost, because all you did was copy and paste some Marx and Engels. The one with the hurt "fee fees" is you and not me.
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 No.341717

>>341592
Take your hand-waving-away of the real problem of infinity elsewhere, freak. You know literally nothing about computer science or maths, stop pretending you do
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 No.341728

>>341592
>There's nothing contradictory about the concept of adding an infinite sequence.
It's not simply about this. People like Weierstrass and Cauchy recognised that the use of infinitesimal in things like Leibniz's notation (as Leibniz originally intended dy/dx to mean what it literally looks like) was contradictory. Hence why they developed new foundations for calculus with and without infinitesimals, leading to the modern orthodox view of the foundations of calculus. You are just denying the premises (that 18th century calculus had no logical foundations) of their work.
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 No.341773

>>341728
The point I was making is that we define the fiction of the infinitesimal in definite logical language, otherwise you couldn't do math with them or say anything about them. It isn't a contradiction in nature or an intractable problem, but rather that you can't treat infinitesimals exactly as if they were real numbers. It's not saying "infinitesimals are not real numbers, therefore you can't do math with them or there's a contradiction in the universe itself". There are ways to do math with numbers that aren't real numbers and systems around those concepts.

The "problem of infinity" is a problem in thought, not something to be imposed by our brains on the universe as a whole.
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 No.341793

>>341773
>The "problem of infinity" is a problem in thought

Sure, agreed. But one borders on empirical dogmatism when they deny that motion in reality is a contradiction. This is what Newton did, he simply asserted that an object possessed a velocity at each instant of time because things did move in reality, ignoring things like Zeno's paradox. Hence why people like Berkeley ridiculed Newton by the phrase "ghosts of departed quantities."

>The whole point of mathematics is that it is formal logic, and there aren't contradictions

Of course mathematics is formalised, but you can't ignore that these abstractions contain knowledge of the real world, of generalised relationships between objects in the world. Engels calls knowledge of mathematical axioms "accumulated inheritance" or something like that, and I think Cockshott agrees with him on this point in one of his videos.

>But it is not at all true that in pure mathematics the mind deals only with its own creations and imaginations. The concepts of number and figure have not been derived from any source other than the world of reality. The ten fingers on which men learnt to count, that is, to perform the first arithmetical operation, are anything but a free creation of the mind. Counting requires not only objects that can be counted, but also the ability to exclude all properties of the objects considered except their number — and this ability is the product of a long historical development based on experience.


>Like all other sciences, mathematics arose out of the needs of men: from the measurement of land and the content of vessels, from the computation of time and from mechanics. But, as in every department of thought, at a certain stage of development the laws, which were abstracted from the real world, become divorced from the real world, and are set up against it as something independent, as laws coming from outside, to which the world has to conform. That is how things happened in society and in the state, and in this way, and not otherwise, pure mathematics was subsequently applied to the world, although it is borrowed from this same world and represents only one part of its forms of interconnection — and it is only just because of this that it can be applied at all.
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 No.341839

>>341359
>"the muon in the apparatus will eventually decay." That it is not a scientific claim is your opinion.
That is a lousy argument because it employs an implicit time limit like the McAfee example (adding a layer of extra cringe because a muon only lasts a few microseconds). The reply by eugenics-kun was much better :P
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 No.342421

>>342403
Alex jones has been talking about hegelian dialectics since 9/11
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 No.342447

>>342421
Didn't know that. Hasn't really made him smarter
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 No.342516

>>341839
No it does not imply an implicit time limit. If you desire to rescue Popper's assertion (not a proof, not the word of God, just an opinion of one (now marginal) philosopher of science) that only falsifiable claims are scientific then you can attempt to distort the claim but the claim is what it is. In fact another scientist may register some disagreement/refinement: "I believe your Penning trap allows some of the muons to fly off rather than decay inside the apparatus. You should account for this effect by calculating the effective lifetime of the muon by estimating the tunneling rate from your trap and using that one instead of the bare muon lifetime."

Once again, you could mutilate the correspondence to have everyone be saying things in a very different way to ensure they make only statements that are falsifiable. To do so would have more to do with the satisfaction of a dogma than with the subject matter discussed by the two scientists.
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 No.342555

>>342516
>you can attempt to distort the claim but the claim is what it is
It's not a distortion of a person's position to add something to that person's statement when the person is in agreement with the content of the addition. What's the difference between the muon example and going from Socrates is human to Socrates is mortal without explicitly stating humans are mortal?
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 No.342558

>>342403
Stop linking directly to Instagram(tm) dumbfuck
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 No.343227


>The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.


>In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.


>The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire.


>Karl Marx London January 24, 1873 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm
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 No.343316

>>341793
Motion is not contradictory though. The contradiction only exists in what we perceive as things, and physics beyond Newton gets into arguments about what, exactly, it is describing the movement of. How we model the movement of bodies, even if that model is just our subjective experience of reality that makes intuitive sense, is not in of itself "the reality". We have to define what is moving, what it is, how it moves, what it is moving through, what is acting upon it, and a whole lot of other things. It only becomes a "contradiction" when we make things into something more than they are. To reality itself, the actual procession of matter doesn't require something animating the movement metaphysically. We can ask questions of what that reality is, what matter is actually doing. But you can't actually impose "matter is fundamentally billiard balls in a 3D space with a time dimension" and say this is the reality, then say there is a contradiction. You're already making a lot of assertions about what physical reality is by thought alone.

Getting back to the falsifiability thing, part of the problem of defining objects at all in nature is that we are always inclined to ask what is beneath some other thing, ad infinitum. We never arrive at a "prime cause". So we have to make some assumptions about the natural world that make intuitive sense, that there are such things as objects and they can be broken down into such and such parts, down to particles which are the smallest kind of thing in our model. (Yes oversimplifcation, but we aren't going to pull some level beneath the subatomic out of our asses and then another ad infinitum to explain every pertubation; any such level would have to be defined and produce something with measurable results, from which we can derive meaning that the particle theory doesn't. Until we have experimental proof in science, we can't really know for sure if the smaller-than-particle thing is actually a thing.) You can see the magician's trick Popper is pulling here with falsifiability; you can carry on the "where's the proofs" argument to say any theory about the natural world isn't falsifiable, by challenging the most basic definitions of what a thing is, or even what "is" is (good one Slick Willy). You see this absurdity played out very often. Part of being able to have a meaningful conversation is that it is possible to agree on observations of phenomena on some level. If someone is going to insist that there is no such thing as "blue" despite clearly being able to see just as other humans do - and especially if the opponent is just saying shit for rhetorical reasons - it's empty sophistry. For us to talk about the motion of anything and communicate that as an idea to each other, we first have to agree on motion being a thing that happens, and that objects do move in some way. You can't derive the reality of motion, or say too much about the reality of motion, from thought alone. But like I say, this is only a problem of thought. Newton "just asserting things move" is entirely appropriate, because "physical object" is already entailing that it is a thing that moves or can move. You wouldn't use Newton's laws to describe an abstract object, like "the words from the Bible".
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 No.343539

>>343316
>The contradiction only exists in what we perceive as things
But this is exactly the point.

From Lenin's notebooks:
>We cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movement, without interrupting continuity, without simplifying, coarsening, dismembering, strangling that which is living. The representation of movement by
means of thought always makes coarse, kills, - and not only by means of thought, but also by sense-perception, and not only of movement, but every concept.
>And in that lies the essence of dialectics.
>And precisely this essence is expressed by the formula: the unity, identity of opposites.

Hence Lenin describes motion, rightly, as the unity of continuity and discontinuity, and thus as a contradiction.

>Motion is the essence of space and time. Two fundamental concepts express this essence: (infinite) continuity (Kontinuitä) and “punctuality” (= denial of continuity, discontinuity). Motion is the unity of continuity (of time and space) and discontinuity (of time and space). Motion is a contradiction, a unity of contradictions.
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 No.343544

>>339707
See Materialism and Empirio-Criticism
<“Engels, apparently, having learned that according to Kant the ‘thing-in-itself’ is unknowable, turned this theorem into its converse and concluded that everything unknown is a thing-in-itself” (p. 33).
>Listen, Mr. Machian: lie, but don’t overdo it! Why, be fore the very eyes of the public you are misrepresenting the very quotation from Engels you have set out to “tear to pieces,” without even having grasped the point under discussion!
>In the first place, it is not true that Engels “is producing a refutation of the thing-in-itself.” Engels said explicitly and clearly that he was refuting the Kantian ungraspable (or unknowable) thing-in-itself. Mr. Chernov confuses Engels’ materialist conception of the existence of things independently of our consciousness. In the second place, if Kant’s theorem reads that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, the “converse” theorem would be: the unknowable is the thing in-itself. Mr. Chernov replaces the unknowable by the unknown, without realising that by such a substitution he has again confused and distorted the materialist view of Engels!

>There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is “beyond” phenomena (Kant), or that we can and must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume)—all this is the sheerest nonsense, Schrulle, crotchet, invention.
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 No.348462

>>336341
covered here
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 No.348616

>>342555
It would in this case be a distortion but not in the scenario you bring up. Socrates can be inferred to be mortal because he is a human, all of which are mortal. When someone says "the muon will decay" they do not have in mind anything like what is proposed in the case regarding McAfee. Will the muon decay by tomorrow? Probably, but I can calculate a finite chance for it not to do that as well. But just as sure as I am in such a calculation I am confident that it eventually decays (barring really extraordinary circumstances like ending up in a machine that induces a quantum zeno effect).

The position that scientific claims must be falsifiable deteriorates even more seriously in the case of thermodynamics. While the muon at least has a half-life that allows us to parameterize a confidence in the statement "the muon will decay by tomorrow" in spite of the theoretical possibility for it not to do that, thermodynamic theory does not put any kind of a time limit on predictions of equilibrium. SURELY we are not going to call thermodynamics non-scientific, yes? In fact every equilibrium theory, be it thermodynamic or economic, will make predictions only in the form of eventualities.

To me deriding such theories or their claims as "non-scientific" requires much stronger argumentation than what Popper provides (he wants to solve the demarcation problem and he is indifferent about what gets thrown under the bus with it).
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 No.349251

>>341793
>Zeno's paradox
as preobrazhensky said, zenon apories is a paradox in definitions, not real world
a problem in thought, as eugenics-kun said
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 No.349264

>>343539
>Hence Lenin describes motion, rightly, as the unity of continuity and discontinuity, and thus as a contradiction.
maybe only contradiction in your understanding of real world, but not real world itself
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 No.349276

>>349264
I made this point in my recent (and first{) podcast about Zeno's paradox - it's a problem in thought, but how we MUST view the world is that events happen in sequence, one after the other, in a discrete way. There isn't a coherent way to describe anything otherwise. It's a whole other thing to claim that because our thinking and language must do that, that it is a rule of reality itself, and reality will break down if its logic is broken.
An example you might have is a computer program, in which movement is processed every game cycle. Suppose you have have a physics engine where if you run into a wall at velocity, the game engine will move your character the fraction of distance to the wall, and you will resume moving the remainder of the distance in a direction reflecting off the wall. What happens if you are colliding between two walls over an infinitesimal distance? You have a computer loop. This presupposes though that we are animating the objects through thought alone, in some central processing unit - which on a computer simulation, you are doing exactly that. So long as you are processing the collisions algorithmically in that way, you will not arrive at a conclusion in that situation. To solve the problem, you would have to include all walls you are colliding into into a system, and the algorithm would have to know when to use calculus to simplify the collision.
The point though is that the very thought experiment is presupposing motion is real and continuous, and the point of processing "fractional movement" is to maintain the continuity of motion that is intuitive to us. In thought, so long as we accept the continuity of motion, we can solve the problem algorithmically. We have to ask ourselves what our algorithm is purporting to do, and how it would potentially crash or fail. If you did imagine movement occuring in instants, then you would only have one cycle after another of movement - which means you wouldn't bother trying to process fractional movement in a cycle. This also means, in Zeno's paradox with Achilles and the tortoise, you get a different answer if you presume motion is discrete, because you can only ever overtake the tortoise on a whole cycle. In that simulation universe where the program just adds "movement in an instant" to position, there isn't a concept of "position at cycle 3.5", only position at cycle 3 and position at cycle 4 - and if you play a game and micromanage down to the frame, this characteristic of movement-by-frame is exploited by game-players and understood as something different from what might make intuitive sense.
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 No.349283

File: 1625132206964.jpg ( 2.89 KB , 111x107 , wtf_sunglasses.jpg )

>>349276
eugene has a fucking PODCAST?
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 No.349782

>>349283
Two episodes so far. Writing the script for the third. It's based on my first book which needs to be rewritten because I've become better at articulating what I'm getting at and could stand to clarify it better.
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 No.349852

>>349782
Why do you do this? I hope you're not writing those walls of text just to kick off some clout project of yours
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 No.349859

>>349852
Walls of texts are based and I'm pretty sure most of his haters don't even read them, as they keep saying he's pro-eugenics for some reason.
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 No.349877

>>349859
>as they keep saying he's pro-eugenics for some reason
Never heard anyone say that. What I did hear however, is that apparently eugene wants to stop demographic collapse by fertilizing countless of women with his semen, as some sort of revenge against the constant bullying he received from girls in high school for being a cripple. He hasn't responded to these allegations, so I assume this story is true
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 No.350063

The unbridgeable gap between Dialectical Materialism and whatever the anons opposed to it adhere to lies in their axiomatic way of thinking.
To return to Cockshott's horse example, the only way to recognize a horse he argues, is to apply an a priori conception of it.
Was it the godly source that was compiled into our minds or where do we as turing machines take the axiom of horses having body parts from?

In contrast real interaction of a human with their environment proceeds in a dialectical fashion.
If you had never seen a horse, an animal or a human before, the movement of the joints of the horse would make their conceptual seperation trivial.

Perception can at first only proceed from grasping a fixed object in motion, or do you construct a function every time you are aiming to throw something?
Formalism in itself is a rejection of the object at hand in favor of an abstraction, which in its approximation is equal and in its inaccuracy is not-equal to it.
Similarly making a state transition diagram does not fully reflect an oxidation, because it neglects the forces present through the movement of atoms and electrons.

A human is not a Von-Neuman-Machine and definitly not written in Pascal.
>>

 No.350256

>>349782
Give us a link then. I can't imagine you had any viewers on until now
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 No.353000

>>336051
This is an old debate and essential to "Western Marxism" (to any principled Marxist this just means a more fanciful variety of revisionism), notice that he refers to the leftcom Pannekoek's almost 120 years old text. To the western marxists it is an essential point so that they can draw a dividing line between themselves and the Bolsheviks and then go on to pursue their idea of marxism and do so in almost nothing but theory and philosophy. Take a look at history, do you see any revolutionary movement emerging from these strains? You do not. Do you think this is by accident? It is not.

This argument essentially relies on simple, superficial language tricks. Once your example fails, they'll go on to proclaim an essential split between Marx and Engels (because Engels makes the revolutionary implications and conclusions of Marxism much more obvious than Marx, who often leaves the room for interpretation revisionists slip into). Then they can also ignore the role of Feuerbach and his critique of philosophy to restore it, or they will use Marx's Paris Manuscripts to claim his project a philosophical one yet in another thousands of ways.

It is as Lenin discovered, with the victory of Marxism over all forms of explicit Utopian socialism the battle has moved into Marxism itself, revisionism was born. There are battles being waged over every concept in Marxism and you will have to study the works of Marx and Engels yourself, internalize them, to be able to recognize the more clever revisionist paths.

Finally, from what I know, Cockshott himself isn't even a Marxist but a neo-Ricardian.
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 No.353180

>>353000
>Finally, from what I know, Cockshott himself isn't even a Marxist but a neo-Ricardian
Sadly you have no proofs for your claims
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 No.353193

>>353180
As they say: "the proof is in the pudding". Just look at his work.
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 No.353202

>>353193
So you can't tell me? Yeah, thought so
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 No.353213

>>353202
What you want me to do a quantitative analysis of how many times he mentions Marx vs Ricardo? If I post a chart with little numbers on it will you fuck off? How about you prove hes a Marxist instead.
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 No.353224

>>353213
How about you first tell us what constitutes a "Neo-Ricardian" in your understanding and then you give us some reocurring themes in Cockshotts works, that fall into this "Neo-Ricardian" paradigm. Not that hard, innit? If your argument is, that marxism can't be empirical then you can more or less fuck off
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 No.353261

bump
>>

 No.353292

At least Engels disagrees wholly and entirely with Cockshott.
>Once again, therefore, it is no one but Herr Dühring who is mystifying us when he asserts that the negation of the negation is a stupid analogy invented by Hegel, borrowed from the sphere of religion and based on the story of the fall of man and his redemp-tion [D. K. G. 504]. Men thought dialectically long before they knew what dialectics was, just as they spoke prose long before the term prose existed.3 The law of negation of the negation, which is unconsciously operative in nature and history and, until it has been recognised, also in our heads, was only first clearly formulated by Hegel.

>Seriously, you can only subdue Hegel by first of all becoming Hegel yourselves. As I have already remarked—Moor's beloved can only die at the hands of Moor


Engels quoting Marx:
>But, as Marx says: "The mystification which dialectics suffers in Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."

Marx literally calling out Cockshott as one of the "peevish, arrogant, mediocre descendants":
>The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion.31 But just as I was working at the first volume ofDas Kapital,it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre '[descendants] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing's time treated Spinoza, i. e., as a "dead dog".33 I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of work-ing in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell

>In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.



MARX BTFOs COCKSHOTT 200 YEARS AGO.
How does he keep doing it?
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 No.353306

>>353224
This isn't a debate. Go do your homework.
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 No.353317

>>353306
Ok what is for homework? Which books should I read?
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 No.353322

>>353317
NTA. Isn't cockshott's whole shtick the implementation of Ricardian LTV on society?
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 No.353326

>>353322
I don't think it is, but if you claim that, then please tell me from which passage you have gotten that impression, so I can reread it and see for myself
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 No.353334

File: 1625303576822.jpeg ( 129.47 KB , 1198x798 , racism bellcurve.jpeg )

>>336051
Thoughts?
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 No.353336

>>353334
Hegel was racist…shocker
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 No.353394

>>353334
This is your brain on idealism
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 No.353447

>>353334
Hegel's not being particularly racist here, at least not at the surface level. This is somewhat in line with Marx's view of history.
>>353326
As I said, I'm not the other anon. I haven't read Cockshott. It seems that he wants to implement a cybernetic labor voucher society where your payment is determined by your labor hours?
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 No.354108

http://davidharvey.org/2018/03/marxs-refusal-of-the-labour-theory-of-value-by-david-harvey/

>It is widely believed that Marx adapted the labour theory of value from Ricardo as a founding concept for his studies of capital accumulation. Since the labour theory of value has been generally discredited, it is then often authoritatively stated that Marx’s theories are worthless. But nowhere, in fact, did Marx declare his allegiance to the labour theory of value. That theory belonged to Ricardo, who recognized that it was deeply problematic even as he insisted that the question of value was critical to the study of political economy. On the few occasions where Marx comments directly on this matter,1 he refers to “value theory” and not to the labour theory of value.
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 No.354116

>>354108
>david harvey is against the labour theory of value
I'm simply shocked
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 No.354166

>>354108
It is widely believed that random /leftypol/ anon liked bread with Nutella on top. But nowhere, in fact, did random /leftypol/ anon declare his allegiance to bread with Nutella on top. That theory belonged to Anonymous Coward on Slashdot, who recognized that it was deeply problematic even as he insisted on it. On the few occasions where random /leftypol/ anon comments directly on this matter, he refers to “Nutella on bread” and not bread with Nutella on top.
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 No.354209

>>354108
This is correct. Harvey had some stupid takes if I recall correctly but this is historically correct if you study classical political economy.
Smith, Ricardo, etc. weren't just saying "labor is the source of value because it feels right". It was rather implied by a lot of philosophy about what the economic actors (people) were, and what it meant to participate in a market economy or any society in which labor is commanded and allocated. Marx followed in that - remember that Capital was a critique of liberal political economy, rather than a defense of it.
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 No.354245

>>354116
>against
It doesn't really sound like it.
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 No.354299

>>354209
> remember that Capital was a critique of liberal political economy, rather than a defense of it
Who…who was claiming that it was a defense?
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 No.354301

>>354209
I heard you have a podcast now. Care to share a link?
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 No.354365

>>

 No.354372

>>354299
The rightoids who think "Marx believed in LTV therefore Capital is wrong because haw haw labor isn't valuable". The whole point is to look at what it would actually mean if labor-power is commodified, to conclude that this arrangement is terrible and rife with contradictions. The reality of wage labor is that it means, very directly, that industrial workers are disciplined by the market, and the bourgeois economists in Marx's time were well aware that labor was very valuable and necessary, hence why it had to be disciplined.

The neoclassical theory is moving away from that stage of capitalism, and moving towards monopoly capitalism and oligarchy. Their answer to classical political economy is "no shit, we want to rule like kings", and they moved steadily towards a more ecological view of value, one befitting an oligarchy of capital that sought to roll back all this talk about commoners having rights at all.
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 No.354876

>>354372
Right I get you and I agree with you, but this place isn't mainly inhabitated by rightoids you know
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 No.354880

>>354365
>listening to eugenes voice
Well I didn't expect you to sound like that, to be honest
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 No.354986

>>354245
The paper is literally called "Marx’s refusal of the labour theory of value" you numbnut
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 No.354992

>>354365
I have read your "Notes on Philosophy" and right at the start you make a imo dishonest strawman in saying that:
>"The ruling class is animated by the spooky force of Capital, and not at all by actual people! People do not have agency!"
Why do you do that? The argument that Marx and consequently other marxists make is that and I quote from page 576 of volume 3:
>The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form

So he is saying that a given economic base has direct influence superstructural elements such as statecraft, culture, law etc.
This isn't a landian type of argument that capital is sentient or some shit like that
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 No.354995

>>354992
Everything he says is dishonest. He's not a marxist either
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 No.354999

>>354995
Not sure yet what this guy's deal is. I sometimes ask what his alliances are, but he is always diverting into some cryptic message. My strong suspicion is that he makes eugenicism this strong central point of his argument, because it is personal for him and we know that people tend to get blinded when shit gets personal. I think he makes some good points though…sometimes
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 No.355634

There is one crucial error in your analysis eugene. Marxism as a theory doesn't have any flaws
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 No.355691

File: 1625418670439.png ( 38.99 KB , 680x680 , socialismdoneleft.png )

>>354365
Eugene you sound like picrel but fatter
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 No.355696

File: 1625418814573.gif ( 1.36 MB , 320x200 , Haha.gif )

>>

 No.355931

>>354986
Not everything is a battle where one side is obliterated. He obviously is doing the classic "standing it on its head" -> value theory of labor
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 No.355936

>>355691
>tfw eugene writes more theory than you have written shitposts in your life
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 No.355980

>>355936
I'm starting to stop ignoring him. Let's say he brings up an interesting perspective to the table. If only it weren't for his strawmanning of certain marxist arguments, to make himself look better like I mentioned here >>354992
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 No.355997

Question, why is Hagel put on such a fucking pedestal? You can shit mountains of turds on Kekegard, Imanuel Can't or Niche, as well as on all the fucking ancient geeks, but attack Gaygel and you'll get an army of Gaygel stans shouting about how "u don't get it" or "u just got filtered". Why put this old idealist german on a pedestal?
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 No.356037

>>355997
Because he formalized something people had been saying for 2000 years and no one has surpassed him since. A few people have "completed" him but no one has done something new, you either reject Hegel or are post-Hegelian.
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 No.356274

>>355980
>>355936
on the offchance this isn't eugene samefagging, go suck a dick. Eugene is a smart guy but his theoryletry and schizoism puts him squarely in pseud territory, even worse than AW
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 No.356551

>>356274
>even worse than AW
That's a tough verdict if I ever heard one
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 No.356561

>>356274
In your opinion, where or in which situations does his theoryletry come through the most
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 No.356649

>>356561
When he relates literally everything to some eugenist conspiracy by the bourgeoisie. See http://eugeneseffortposts.royalwebhosting.net/
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 No.361243

Ok, I am a big fan of Cockshott, but I think his big ego lets him sometimes say shit that is completely misguided.
Like his last vid, where he applies the same categories of socialists that Marx and Engels conceived in the fucking 1840s in order to describe currents that were present in the workers movement at this time. Most of them, are completely dead now and he still applies them to our modern context like some platonist. Why is he doing this?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AjbWWvdIEI&t=454s
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 No.361278

>>361243
He's a computer scientist, expect massive amounts of autism.
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 No.361291

>>361278
In some portions it definitely starts to feel like it.
Like for example, he says the greens are reactionary socialists. Who's gonna tell him that not only are the fucking greens not even socialist in name, nor are they advocating for some sort of agrarian patriarchal society. Anglo box moment sadly for Cockshott.
Maybe his rejection of dialectics can be partially blamed for this rigid reliance on categories and definitions(when it comes to anything outside economics and cs atleast)
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 No.361383

>>361291
>Maybe his rejection of dialectics can be partially blamed for this rigid reliance on categories and definitions
Yes, literally. He is like the vulgar materialists Lenin Engels and Marx describe, who see things in a metaphysical way, as totally static. Doesn't understand (at least in lots of things) that he should look at things as they develop
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 No.361431

>>361243
>>361383
This is a misscharacterization Cockshott's position on dialectics, he said that the aspects that are derived from Hegelian logic should abandoned because the same philosophical concepts can be expressed much better with newer schools of thought.
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 No.361446

>>361431
Maybe, but man is he mechanical. I was like, ok you want a modern manifesto? Great, but then don't start the video by literally applying 19th century political currents in Germany to modern day China, Russia, Spain etc.
What was he thinking
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 No.361475

>>361431
> because the same philosophical concepts can be expressed much better with newer schools of thought.
This doesn't sound like him but source? What concepts?
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 No.361501

>>361446
I didn't find anything objectionable with his video
<On the need for a programme
>>361475
It's spread out over his many videos where he touches on the subject from time to time, where he also recommends many writers who have outdone Hegel in terms of explaining these things clearly. I don't know how i would retrieve all the information you ask in a timely fashion. It's well worth watching his videos, and you could take notes as you go along.
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 No.361513

>>361501
>I didn't find anything objectionable with his video
The video as such isn't that bad, but he should be careful in drawing analogies or applying long outdated categories to modern society
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 No.361548

>>361513
>The video as such isn't that bad, but he should be careful in drawing analogies or applying long outdated categories to modern society
I couldn't see any wrong categories, what are you talking about ?
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 No.361590

>>361501
>outdone Hegel in terms of explaining these things clearly
But explain what clearly? He doesn't think the ideas that Hegel talks about - the philosophical concepts as you call them - are worth anything at all. He says that stuff like Turing supersedes it, though it's clearly a separate project.
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 No.361591

>>

 No.361593

>>361548
>>361591
It's mainly the "reactionary socialist" section, because the bourgeois and democratic socialists are in essence just our modern day reformists.
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 No.361743

>>361590
Cockshott said that reading Hegel isn't worth the time for leftist that are now getting into Marxist theory and should instead read more modern stuff. Because Hegel was wrong about some stuff (you can't get 2 kilos of theory from one kilo of axioms) and also was superseded by later thinkers.
>>361593
>It's mainly the "reactionary socialist" section, because the bourgeois and democratic socialists are in essence just our modern day reformists.
Ok I'm going to watch that part again.
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 No.361902

>>361743
> Because Hegel was wrong about some stuff (you can't get 2 kilos of theory from one kilo of axioms)
Utter nonsense. Prove it. Also see >>337918
- we already talked about this here
>also was superseded by later thinkers.
Specifics please, what and who
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 No.362383


>>361501 sounds like a peterson tier "you wouldn't understand unless you watched all 42 lectures" non-argument.

>>361431
I've been watching Cockshott since his first video in 2018 and I haven't seen
>the same philosophical concepts can be expressed much better with newer schools of thought.
at all.
If you are referring to him sporadically telling people to read Turing and Darwin then I completely disagree. He does not refer to the same concepts he rejects them and claims there is no need for them because science has superseded all other knowledge. I'm also a fan of his work but he really doesn't understand philosophy.
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 No.385418

File: 1626599102437.jpeg ( 249.67 KB , 1920x1080 , 1626403569293.jpeg )

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 No.385798

>>385418
As far as I know computers play go at the top level.
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 No.385804

>>385798
playing go better than humans is not the same as solving go
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 No.385822

there is a very good german video with english subtitles explaining hegelian dialectics
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 No.385836

>>385804
what does "solving go" means?
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 No.386868

>>

 No.386877

>>385836
Imagine the strategy needed for tik tak toe, 3x3 board alternating turns. It's extremely simple for us to tie every single game, because we have solved it.
Go is 19x19, so it's a bit bigger and requires quite a few more calculations than even chess.
>>

 No.409451

bagel;

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