No.400658
>Of all the important socialists of the twentieth century, it was Trotsky who recognized most clearly the main tendencies of development and the principal contradictions of the epoch, and it was Trotsky also who gave the clearest formulation to an appropriate emancipatory strategy for the international labour movement. His contribution to the history of this century was a predominantly political one and not, as some have maintained, purely sociological. 1 It was also an eminently practical one and not purely analytic-theoretical. He developed a concept or model of the differentiated processes of class struggle on a global scale and drew from this the necessary practical, strategic, tactical and organizational conclusions. These ideas, however, were rooted in a magnificent theoretical achievement, the discovery of the law of uneven and combined development, quite distinct from the law of uneven development familiar to all Marxists. 2 On the basis of a thoroughgoing application of the dialectical method to the analysis of the imperialist epoch, in particular to the period of its decline, Trotsky's theory brings to light the articulation of all the major elements (economic, political, class, psychological, ideological and organizational) of a historical mechanism at work:
>1. In the imperialist epoch, the Marxist evolutionary schema, according to which the advanced nations hold up to the more underdeveloped the image of their own future, is turned into its opposite. Imperialism blocks the radical modernization and industrialization of the underdeveloped countries.
>2. This leads, in the imperialist countries themselves, to a contradictory economic dynamic. The imperialist countries can grow organically only to the extent that there is space for expansion into the colonies and semi-colonies. But, with imperialism dominating the whole world, this underdevelopment which imperialism itself has consolidated in the colonies and semi-colonies becomes a hindrance toits own further growth. This will lead increasingly to inter-imperialist conflict. Once the expansion process of imperialism has come to an end, it is the struggle over the division of the world market that becomes decisive. At the same time, the system as a whole tends towards stagnation or decline in productive forces.
>3. This reversal of capitalism's economic advance and the onset of stagnation, accompanied by a sharpening of periodic economic crises, increases the susceptibility of the system to general social and economic crisis. What was an exception in the nineteenth century becomes the rule in the twentieth. This applies to the social and political relations within the underdeveloped as well as within the imperialist countries; it also applies to the relations among the imperialist states and between the latter and the Third World. The twentieth century will be the century of wars and civil wars, of revolutions and counter-revolutions.
>4. The combined effect of all these factors will lead to a strengthening of retrogressive movements in society, to a growing threat to the progressive gains of the bourgeois revolutions and to an increasing fusion of the 'old' pre-capitalist barbarism with 'new' forms of barbarism being created by capitalism's decline. Massive catastrophes threaten the human race. 4 The First World War is an example of such barbarism. There will be other examples, even worse than this one.
>5. The modern class of wage-earners is the only social force able to bring this series of social catastrophes to an end. This is a consequence of its key position in economic life as well as of its social and socio-psychological make-up. The individual wage-earners, because of their subordination and their material weakness in the economic process vis-a-vis the employers, can defend their immediate day-to-day imerests only by developing co-operation and solidarity with their fellow workers and by making this co-operation the driving force behind their social practice, rather than egoism and competition. 5 But this is precisely the kind of motivation and driving force that is essential for the reorganization of society as a whole, to lead society out of the dead end of capitalism and towards the only possible positive alternative, namely, socialism.
>6. Because of the system's increasing susceptibility to crisis, in the imperialist countries as well as in the Third World, the state, especially in periods of severe crisis, will become a violently repressive instrument of force in the hands of the ruling classes. Without the overthrow of this state, without the seizure of power by the working class, this class will not be able to fulfil its historic tasks of preventing the regression to barbarism. 6
>7. In the imperialist countries the main obstacle to the seizure of state power is the growing conservatism of the leadership of the organized labour movement, concomitant with ideological weaknesses in the working class itself.7 (Later, Trotsky was to provide a materialist explanation of this conservatism with his account of the development of a labour bureaucracy as a distinct social layer with its own special interests.) It would require time and new experiences in struggle before the working class of the industrialized countries would be able to overcome these ideological weaknesses.
>8. In some less developed countries 8 the working class can achieve a much higher level of class-consciousness, of unity and militancy than in the more developed countries. It is therefore possible, if not probable, that the working class in these countries will be able to seize state power before workers in the West.
>9. Self-activity and self-organization are the natural instruments for seizing as well as exercising state power. The soviets or councils are the form of proletarian power brought forward by history itself, in the industrialized as well as in the less developed countries. 9 Shortly after his imprisonment in 1906, Trotsky wrote his History of the Soviet, in which he summed up the role of the Petrograd Soviet: Urban Russia was too narrow a base for the struggle. The Soviet tried to wage the struggle on a national scale, but it remained above all a Petersburg institution … there is no doubt that in the next upsurge of revolution, such Councils of Workers, will be formed all over the country. An All-Russian Soviet of Workers, organized by a national congress … will assume the leadership: . . . with revolutionary co-operation between the army, the peasantry and the plebian parts of the middle classes … 10 This is exactly what happened in 1917.
>10. In the less developed countries, however, the working class constitutes only a minority of the population. Without an alliance with the working peasantry, the workers cannot win or maintain state power. The historic tasks of the revolution in these countries are those of the bourgeois or national-democratic revolution. In this respect Trotsky, like the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, was stating the position of classical Marxism. What was new in Trotsky's position, his strategy of permanent revolution, was his assertion that these historic tasks of the bourgeois revolution could only be achieved through the creation of a dictatorship of the proletariat in alliance with the working peasantry. 11
>11. It is only through self-activity and self-organization that the working class can conquer state power. For this precise reason it is unrealistic to attempt to impose on the working class a self-limitation, whereby they restrict themselves, for historical-theoretical reasons, to achieving national-democratic goals (the classical tasks of the bourgeois revolution). A politically successful, self-activating, self-conscious, well-organized working class will not continue to allow itself to be commanded and exploited by the employers. 12 In a very practical way the working class, as soon as it has conquered state power, will begin to address the tasks of the socialist revolution. Without stages or interruptions, the revolution will combine the achievement of national-democratic goals with the beginning of the achievement of socialist goals. 13
>12. But precisely this same law of uneven and combined development, which made it possible for the working class in Russia to conquer state power before the workers in Germany, made it impossible for the workers in Russia alone to hold on to this power over a long period. (Trotsky later qualified this: what would be impossible in such circumstances would be the long-term direct exercise of state power by the workers.) The construction of socialism is dependent on the existence of material preconditions which can be ignored only at the price of severe disillusionment (we would add today: of severe excesses). On this point Trotsky was firmly within the tradition of Marx, who wrote in The German Ideology:
<This 'alienation', to use a term which the philosophers will understand, can be abolished only on the basis of two practical premisses. To become an 'intolerable' power, that is, a power against which men make a revolution, it must have made the great mass of humanity 'propertyless' and this at the same time in contradiction to an existing world of wealth and culture, both of which presuppose a great increase in productive power and a high degree of its development. On the other hand, this development of productive forces (which already implies the actual empirical existence of men on a world-historical rather than local scale) is an absolutely necessary practical premiss because, without it, want is merely made more general, and with destitution the struggle for necessities and all the old muck would necessarily be reproduced; and furthermore, because only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal commerce among men established which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of a 'propertyless' mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally replaces local individuals with world-historical, empirically universal individuals. Without this, (1) communism could only exist locally; (2) the forces of interaction themselves could not have developed as universal and thus intolerable powers, but would have remained homebred, superstitious 'conditions'; (3) any extension of interaction would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of dominant peoples 'all at once' and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive power and worldwide interaction linked with communism. Besides, the mass of propertyless workers - labour-power on a mass scale cut off from capital or even limited satisfaction, and hence no longer just temporarily deprived of work as a secure source of life - presupposes a world market through competition. The proletariat thus can only exist world-historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have a world-historical existence. World-historical existence of individuals means existence of individuals which is directly bound up with world history. 14
>Today, this reads like a tragic anticipation of what has happened in the Soviet Union and in the Eastern Bloc since the 1950s, if not since the 1930s. The victory of the working class in underdeveloped Russia could only have been consolidated by means of an extension of the successful revolution to at least some of the leading industrial nations of the world. Isolated in a relatively backward country, the revolution was vulnerable to the growing pressure of the imperialist world market, not just militarily but also, and above all else, economically. 15
>13. This by no means implied that the victorious Russian revolution was confronted with the dilemma, either capitulate to capitalism or seek salvation in 'revolutionary war', in the artificial 'export of the revolution' . 16 Quite the contrary. In view of capitalist society's fundamental susceptibility to crisis on a world scale, the realistic alternative was the temporary consolidation of the achievements of the Russian revolution at an intermediate level (post-capitalist but not yet socialist), with political support for the communist parties outside Russia, in order to take advantage of the more favourable conditions that would exist when the workers fought for the conquest of state power in a number of different countries. This required mature and independent cadres and leaders in these parties as well as politically mature workers who were united and willing to engage in the struggle for power. Such an alternative would mean a radical rejection of the utopian attempt to construct socialism fully in a single country, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the attempt to subordinate the international movement, by means of manipulation, directives and adventures, to the (supposed and short-sighted) state interests and diplomatic manoeuvres of the 'besieged fortress'. This alternative presupposed an autonomous maturation process of the revolutionary movement and of the working-class parties of each country. It also presupposed, in the Soviet Union, an economic policy which was directed towards a gradual strengthening of the overall weight of the working class in society. This alternative strategy simply meant the extension of Trotsky's fundamental orientation of self-organization and self-liberation of the proletariat (an orientation he shared with Marx, Luxemburg and the Lenin of State and Revolution) to the global level of world politics.
>14. In the epoch that began with the First World War, reformist gradualism showed itself to be as much a reactionary utopianism as the attempt to construct socialism fully in a single country. 17 In a period of successive severe economic, social and political crises, bourgeois society is periodically forced to overturn previously established reforms, to avail itself of more repressive forms of rule, including that of a terrorist dictatorship. In such situations, to rely on the support of liberal currents or to trust the liberal traditions of middle-class society as a way of fighting against this danger is unrealistic. Only the forceful intervention of a united proletariat, in mass mobilizations and mass organizations, is capable of meeting this threat. To put a brake on this extra-parliamentary mass mobilization, because it would antagonize capital and push the liberals and the petty bourgeoisie into the camp of reaction, could only lead to a victory of reactionary forces. 18 Therefore, the conquest of state power by the working class will be periodically on the agenda in the imperialist countries just as it is in the less developed countries.
>15. The main obstacle to the development of an adequate strategy and tactics for the working class and mass movements in our century is the theory and practice (the practice came before the theory) of substitutionism, in other words, the replacement of the independent working class as the agent of social change and transformation by some other agency: party, state, government, parliament, and so on. These are all useful and, at times, indispensable instruments of working-class emancipation. But they must remain subordinate to the real movement of self-emancipation. Every attempt to reverse this means-end dialectic is doomed to fail eventually and it makes the process of working-class emancipation more difficult. This implies a rejection of both Stalinism and Social Democracy. No working class and no nation can be made happy against its own will. If a rejection of all forms of substitutionism means that the emancipation process takes longer than had been programmed by the bureaucrats, then this is certainly the lesser evil, especially in the light of the long-term disastrous consequences that follow from such substitutionist practices.
>16. Blocking the mass organizations of the working class from going beyond what they have already achieved corresponds not to the interests of the class itself but rather to those of its conservative leadership, the labour bureaucracy. In the capitalist countries, but particularly in the Soviet Union, this labour bureaucracy becomes an autonomous social layer with its own interests, which are quite different from those of both the working class and the bourgeoisie. It does not constitute a new class and is incapable of reproducing itself but, over a prolonged historical period, it is capable of maintaining and extending its power and privileges; in other words, it is capable of reaching a certain degree of historical autonomy. In the final analysis, this autonomy is a result of the relative passivity of the working class and the absence of the international revolution.
>17. To break out of this historical impasse, in which neither the international working class nor international capital is able to fight its way out of the crisis of civilization, the emergence once again of broad mass struggles, which is inevitable in any case, is not enough. The conquest of political power and the construction of socialism are tasks that can only be resolved consciously. A breakthrough in the direction of socialism will only occur when these periodically erupting mass struggles coincide with the existence of politically mature and tested working-class militants and working-class parties and a high level of consciousness in broad layers of workers. Marxism of the twentieth century will only succeed if it never loses sight of the subjective historical factor, in other words, if it rejects both mechanical-evolutionary fatalism and primitive voluntarism. Trotsky was well aware of the world-historical problem which lay at the root of this socio-political stalemate. In his report on the Third Congress of the Communist International, delivered at the Second Congress of the Communist Youth International in 1921, he made this clear:
<The bourgeoisie and the working class are thus located on a soil which renders our victory inescapable - not in the astronomical sense of course, not inescapable like the setting or rising of the sun, but inescapable in the historical sense, in the sense that unless we gain victory all society and all human culture is doomed. History teaches us this. It was thus that the ancient Roman civilization perished. The class of slave owners proved incapable of leading towards further development. It became transformed into an absolutely parasitic and decomposing class. There was no other class to supersede it and the ancient civilization perished … the possibility is not excluded that the bourgeoisie, armed with its state apparatus and its entire accumulated experience, may continue fighting the revolution until it has drained modern civilization of every atom of its vitality, until it has plunged modern mankind into a state of collapse and decay for a long time to come. By all the foregoing, I simply want to say that the task of overthrowing the bourgeoisie which confronts the working class is not a mechanical one. It is a task which requires for its fulfilment: revolutionary energy, political sagacity, experience, broadness of vision, resoluteness, hot blood, but at the same time a sober head. 19
>Trotsky's overall assessment of the main tendencies of development in this century, which we have just summarized, was developed during the years between 1903 and 1923 and completed in the period 1930-33. He was also a political actor during this period, attempting to put into practice the political conclusions that flowed from this general world-view, initially in the Russian revolution of 1905, when he was leader of the Petrograd Soviet; in 1917 as leader of the Petrograd Soviet and organizer of the October Revolution; in the period 1918-20 as creator of the Red Army, which he then led to victory in the civil war; in 1923/24 as initiator of the Left Opposition against the Soviet bureaucracy and against the Stalin faction which represented it in the Russian Communist Party and in the Communist International; in the struggle for the united front of the German workers in the fight against fascism in the period 1930-33; in his efforts to promote the new upsurge of the international revolution in the years 1934-37. His significance in the history of the twentieth century cannot therefore be reduced to his role in the Russian Revolution between 1917 and 1920. If we look at his theoretical and practical achievements in the light of the actual course of events this century, we would also have to point to significant theoretical and practical errors of judgement. The most important of these was his continued acceptance of the theory, which stemmed more from Zinoviev, the young Bukharin and Rosa Luxemburg than it did from Lenin, according to which the growth of productive forces was impossible under imperialism. Although this thesis was by and large correct for the period 1914-45, it was definitely shown to be incorrect by the long post-war boom which lasted until the end of the 1960s or the early 1970s. This misjudgement on Trotsky's part becomes all the more remarkable when we realize that in 1921 he predicted quite an alternative scenario. In his report to the Third Congress of the Communist International on the world economic situation, this is how he described the possibility of a new capitalist revival: Here we approach the question of social equilibrium …. If we grant – and let us grant it for the moment - that the working class fails to rise in revolutionary struggle, but allows the bourgeoisie the opportunity to rule the world's destiny for a long number of years, say, two or three decades, then assuredly some sort of new equilibrium will be established. Europe will be thrown violently into reverse gear. Millions of European workers will die from unemployment and malnutrition. The United States will be compelled to re-orient itself on the world market, reconvert its industry and suffer curtailment for a considerable period. Afterwards, after a new world division of labour is thus established in agony for fifteen or twenty or twenty-five years, a new epoch of capitalist upswing might perhaps
occur. 20
>Twenty-five/thirty years after 1921 the post-war boom of 1948/49 began. Trotsky's prediction was uncannily correct. Closely linked to this misjudgement was a second. This was in the period just before the Second World War when Trotsky believed that a new decisive test of world-historical importance would, in a very short time, decide the fate of the Soviet Union and indeed the fate of the international working class. In an article, 'The USSR in War' (September 1939), Trotsky wrote:
<If this war provokes, as we firmly believe, a proletarian revolution, it must inevitably lead to the overthrow of the bureaucracy in the USSR and the regeneration of Soviet democracy on a far higher economic and cultural basis than in 1918. In that case the question as to whether the Stalinist bureaucracy was a 'class' or a growth on the workers' state will be automatically solved. To every single person it will become clear that in the process of development of the world revolution the Soviet bureaucracy was only an episodic relapse. If, however, it is conceded that the present war will provoke not revolution but a decline of the proletariat, then there remains another alternative: the further decay of monopoly capitalism, its further fusion with the state and the replacement of democracy wherever it still remained by a totalitarian regime …. This would be, according to all indications, a regime of decline, signalling the eclipse of civilization …. The historic alternative, carried to the end, is as follows: either the Stalin regime is an abhorrent relapse in the process of transforming bourgeois society into a socialist society, or the Stalin regime is the first stage of a new exploiting society. If the second prognosis proves to be correct, then, of course, the bureaucracy will become a new exploiting class. However onerous the second perspective may be, if the world proletariat should actually prove itself incapable of fulfilling the mission placed on it by the course of development, nothing else would remain except only to recognize that the socialist programme, based on the international contradictions of capitalist society, ended as a Utopia. 21
>This assessment flowed logically from the assumption that a new growth in productive forces would be impossible, thus blocking the preconditions for a successful breakthrough to socialism. Six months later, in his Manifesto of the Conference of the Fourth International, his real political testament, Trotsky corrected his earlier assessment of the time-scale involved:
It is not a question of a single uprising. It is a question of an entire revolutionary epoch…. It is necessary to prepare for long years, if not decades, of wars, uprisings, brief interludes of truces, new wars, and new uprisings …. The question of tempos and time intervals is of enormous importance; but it alters neither the general historical perspective nor the direction of our policy. The conclusion is a simple one: it is necessary to carry on the work of educating and organizing the proletarian vanguard with tenfold energy. 22
>Once this assumption about the impossibility of growth in productive forces under imperialism is seen to be wrong, then, at the same time, it becomes clear that the material and human preconditions for socialism in our epoch are not in decline; on the contrary, human productive forces in particular - the number of wage-earners, their levels of skill and culture - are expanding rapidly. Socialism, the world revolution, remain a real possibility. Finally, it was not until 1917 that Trotsky succeeded in synthesizing his rejection of substitutionism and his clear understanding of the need for a proletarian vanguard organization to ensure a successful outcome to the struggles that erupt during those periodically recurring revolutionary crises. In the period from 1907 to 1916, he defended the illusion that the mass pressure of a revolutionary proletariat would be adequate to force the different wings of the socialist labour movement into common action. This was what actually happened during the Russian revolution of 1905. But from 1916 at the latest, in Germany, Austria and Russia, even earlier in Italy and elsewhere, it was clear that this semi-spontaneist, semi-conciliatory assumption had no basis in reality. 23
>But even taking into account these misjudgements, Trotsky's theoretical and political achievements are without parallel this century. He will go down in history as the most important strategist of the socialist movement. And now even more so, when the clearly recognized bankruptcy of Stalinism and Social Democracy put the debate about socialism once again on the historical agenda, Trotsky's inheritance will assume even greater importance as the main historical alternative to both those currents in the modern labour movement.